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There is an apparent contradiction within the U.S. Army Acquisition Corps between
the stated intent to capitalize on the operational experience of the military members of the
Corps, and the philosophy used in distributing officers within the Corps. Following
enactment of the Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act in 1990 the Army
created the Army Acquisition Corps (AAC). A review of the billets available for
Functional Area 97 contracting officers, however, reveals that well over half of the
positions are coded for branch immaterial officers, meaning any officer from any branch
can fill the slot. The objective of this thesis is to examine the rationale behind the current
organization of contracting personnel in an attempt to determine whether there should be
more FA 97 positions coded to require branch, or branch-type, specific officers, as well
as to identify where the billets should be.
A survey of 175 senior officers in the AAC was conducted in order to gauge the
level of command preference for user experience on the part of contracting officers.
Respondents indicated that: an increase in the level of emphasis placed on branch coding
FA 97 billets should be beneficial but that a determination as to the cost of an increased
reliance must first be made; the best level for branch coding decisions is at the
organizational level; and there does exist a relationship between the Career Management
Fields and the AMC MACOM commodity group organization. Additionally, the research
indicated that there are no existing prohibitions in place that prevent, or bar, the
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The thesis recommends that: the FA 97 proponency office explore the feasibility
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governing the emphasis on branch coding; PERSCOM alter the assignment policy used
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each. The focus of this review must be on whether or not a branch specific officer could
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I. INTRODUCTION
We are now witnessing the death of management.
By management, I mean the peculiarly American idea
(still taught at many business schools) that a
"good manager" should be able to manage any
enterprise, anywhere, any time. Through incisive
analysis and decisive action, our supermanagers
supposedly could make any company productive and
profitable.
With hindsight, we can see the absurdity. We
don't imagine a winning football coach switching to
basketball, nor a concert pianist becoming a
symphony violinist. We don't think an orthopedic
surgeon would automatically make a good
psychiatrist. We recognize that differences in
talent, temperament, knowledge and experience make
some people good at some things and not at
others. [20]
The quote above is taken from an article by Robert J. Samuelson in
which he takes a critical view of the commonly held belief that
managers can manage without possessing in-depth knowledge of, or
prior experience with, the business they are charged with managing
f 20 1 . The quote readily summarizes the critical issue of the
thesis at hand - whether or not U.S. Army contracting officers are
the "supermanagers" to which Samuelson refers, or should their
previous operational experience play a role in the billets to which
these officers are assigned.
A. GENERAL.
In 1990 the United States Congress enacted the Defense
Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA) which mandated
specific criteria to be met by Department of Defense (DOD)
personnel performing procurement related duties. One particular
mandate of DAWIA was that by 1 October 1993 the Defense Department
had to establish a professional acquisition workforce [8: s.1644].
As a result, the U.S. Total Army Personnel Command (PERSCOM)
established the U.S. Army Acquisition Corps (AAC) the purpose of
which was to "...establish a combined, specialized corps of
military and civilian acquisition professionals." [25: p.l]
The military portion of the AAC is composed of officers
serving in one of three Functional Areas (FAs): FA 51-Research,
Development and Acquisition; FA 53-Systems Automation; and FA 97-
Contracting and Industrial Management. The personnel managers at
PERSCOM were faced with two fundamental issues in deciding how to
establish the Acquisition Corps. First, they had to determine from
where the AAC population would be drawn. Second, they had to
devise a plan for employing the population within the AAC. In
essence, PERSCOM had to answer two questions: How do we bring
officers in to the AAC? Once we bring them in, how do we
distribute the officers within the AAC? The method used for
answering each of these questions is discussed below along with an
examination of how the two methods impacted on the FA 97
Contracting officers.
1. Bringing officers in to the AAC population. In building
the AAC two major issues that had to be addressed were the branch
composition of the officers being drawn into the corps, and the
overall size of the corps in terms of total number of officers.
Every officer in the United States Army is, upon his/her
commissioning, designated with one of 15 primary basic branches
that determine the Career Management Field (CMF) in which the
officer will serve for at least their initial eight to ten years of
service and in most cases their entire careers. According to the
Army's manual, Commissioned Officer Professional Development and
Utilization
,,
during each officer's initial period of service
"...professional development and development of the skills
associated with (the) officer's branch are emphasized through
assignments and training." [24: p. 7] Basic branches are further
grouped into one of three categories: Combat Arms (CA) , Combat
Support (CS), and Combat Service Support (CSS). For the purpose of
this thesis, branches will be categorized as either combat arms or
non-combat arms. The six branches, and their associated CMFs, that
comprise the combat arms category are: Infantry-CMF 11, Armor-CMF
12, Field Artillery-CMF 13, Air Defense Artillery-CMF 14, Aviation-
CMF 15, and Special Forces-CMF 18.
In order to identify the branch composition, as well as the
size, of the AAC, PERSCOM relied upon a projection of what the Army
would "look like" after the force reduction was completed. This
projection, known as Notional Force-25 (NOF-25), depicts the total
size and branch composition of the entire Army. Ostensibly, the
"...basic premise of the distribution methodology is that the
percentage of participation in the AAC by branch should reflect the
composition of the Army." [25: p. 7] The percentages of branch
participation in the AAC differed somewhat from the NOF-25
projections based on a reduced participation by some branches due
to their relative strength and ability to "lose" officers to the
Acquisition Corps. The NOF projection was combined with a model
known as the Acquisition Cohort Life Cycle Model (ACLCM) which
identified the requisite number of 0-6s needed to "...perform
duties in acquisition critical (4Z) positions predicted by the
notional force (NOF) of the future...." [25: p. 7] Based on the
required number of Colonels , PERSCOM "reverse-aged" the population
to the 0-3 level using a model that "...accounts for attrition,
enhanced promotion rates, required stability..." and the ability of
each branch to lose officers. The result of the NOF projections
and the ACLCM was an ultimate corps' size of 2500 officers in the
grades of 0-3 through 0-6. The branch composition of the
Acquisition Corps is depicted in Figure 1 below.
NOF-25 *
Figure 1. AAC POPULATION BY BRANCH. Source: [12]
2. Distributing officers within the AAC. Given the
population of the AAC as determined by the ACLCM and NOF-25, the
next step was to develop a position list that identified the
billets in which the officers would serve. This was accomplished
by having each Major Command (MACOM) in the acquisition community
identify their requirements for uniformed officers. This
requirements list was then validated by a panel of senior
acquisition officers (known as the Council of Colonels) and
reconciled with the available pool of officers in the population.
In identifying their needs the MACOMs were responsible for also
identifying the branch requirements for each of their positions.
[14]
Based on the ACLCM, NOF-25, and the position requirements as
identified/validated by the MACOMs and Council of Colonels, PERSCOM
developed a Military Acquisition Position List (MAPL) showing 2236
billets in a variety of Army, Joint, and DOD acquisition
organizations. Each billet is coded in one of three ways. The
code will indicate either: the basic branch from which the officer
should come (e.g. Infantry, Signal Corps, Ordinance, etc.); it will
indicate a branch type (e.g. Combat Arms, Combat Support, or Combat
Service Support) , or it will be coded as a "branch immaterial"
position meaning an officer from any branch can be assigned to fill
the position.
A question that remains is whether or not the philosophy used
in building the corps carried through to the method used in
distributing the population within the corps. The corps was built
so as to "...reflect the composition of the Army..." [25.: p. 7] in
terms of basic branches. One of the primary purposes for including
a uniformed presence in the AAC at all (as opposed to a completely
civilian corps), was "...to capitalize on the operational
experience of the military officers...." [25: p. 2] Additionally,
as previously stated, an officer's operational experience is gained
during assignments in his/her basic branch [24: p. 7]. If the Corps
is built so as to reflect the branch composition of the Army, the
purpose of having officers is to capitalize on their operational
experience, and the operational experience of officers is developed
through service in their basic branch, it would only seem to make
intuitive sense that the MAPL should be built so as to mirror the
branch composition of the corps. It appears that it does not.
A review of the Acquisition Corps population of 2500 officers
shows that 44.4% are combat arms officers and 55.6% are non-combat
arms [12]. See Figure 2 on the following page. The same review
of the MAPL indicates that of 2236 billets, or slots, 24.1% are
coded for combat arms, 21.3 % are coded for non-combat arms, and
54.6% are coded as branch immaterial [13.]. See Figure 3 on the
following page.
As the graphs seem to indicate, there is an apparent
"disconnection" between the philosophy for building (i.e. bringing
officers in) the AAC in terms of the stated desire for operational
experience, and the philosophy for employing (i.e. distributing)
the officers within the AAC in that over half of the billets are
branch immaterial. This disconnection becomes even more apparent
when we zero in on the FA 97 Contracting officers.
3. Impact on FA 97 Contracting Officers. The FA 97
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Figure 2: AAC POPULATION BY
BRANCH TYPE. Source [12]
Figure 3. AAC BILLETS BY BRANCH
TYPE. Source: [13]
population constitutes 23.4%, or 585, of the total AAC inventory of
2500 officers and is 49% combat arms officers. Of the 2236
billets, or slots, on the MAPL, 534 are designated for FA 97
officers. A review of the MAPL for the entire Acquisition Corps
reveals that 54.6% are branch immaterial, 24.1% are combat arms,
and 21.3% are non-combat arms [7]. The same review for the FA 97
slots reveals that 83.5% are coded as branch immaterial, 6.8% are
coded for combat arms officers, and 9.7% are coded for non-combat
arms. [13.:]. Adhering to the philosophy that a picture is worth a
thousand words, the graphic comparison of the FA 97 population with
the FA 97 billets by branch type reveals what appears to be a
significant disparity between building the FA 97 population, and
employing that population. See Figures 4 and 5 on the following
page.
The bottom line here is that the philosophy used in
distributing the officers within the AAC, particularly in terms of
FA S7 P0PUIAT1CN BY BWWCH TYPE






Figure 4. FA97 POPULATION BY Figure 5. FA97 BILLETS BY
BRANCH TYPE. Source: [13] BRANCH TYPE. Source: [13]
combat arms officers and FA 97 officers, seems to contradict the
stated intent to capitalize on the operational experience of the
military members of the Corps. Based on the published guidance and
stated intentions for building the AAC, one would think that
officers should be assigned to acquisition billets that will allow
them to bring their expertise to bear on the types of equipment,
supplies, and services with which they are operationally familiar.
Lieutenant General Cianciolo, the then Director of Acquisition
Career Management (DACM), stated that if he (the General) were a
young officer considering a career shift into the AAC he would
consider it a plus to have the opportunity to "...see to it that
the skills and knowledge I have can be brought to bear in a manner
that enhances the defense of the United States and particularly the
Army." [6: p. 9] The question that begs itself is to what extent
this is true for the FA 97 portion of the AAC.
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B. OBJECTIVES.
The objective of this thesis is to examine the rationale
behind the current organization of contracting personnel within the
Acquisition Corps with an eye towards determining whether or not
sufficient emphasis has been placed on basic branch (i.e.
operational experience) in coding billets for FA 97 Contracting
Officers. More specifically, the thesis will attempt to determine
whether there should be more FA 97 positions coded to require
branch, or branch-type, specific officers, as well as to identify
where the billets should be.
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS.
The following research questions will be answered by the
thesis.
Primary . Should operational, or user, experience be a factor
in the assignment of Contracting Officers to commands responsible
for procuring supplies and services?
Subsidiary.
1. What commands are responsible for procuring supplies
and services?
2. What is the legislative, regulatory, and command
guidance concerning the preference for user experience and
knowledge on the part of the cognizant Contracting Officer?
3. What was the rationale behind the development of the
basic branch coding in the current fielding plan of the uniformed
Contracting Officers in the Army Acquisition Corps?
4. To what extent, and under what conditions, would a
lack of user experience on the part of the Procuring Contracting
Officer reduce the effectiveness of an acquisition action?
5. Should specific user experience be required for
officers being assigned to duties as Contracting Officers in
commands that buy supplies and services?
D. SCOPE, LIMITATIONS, AND ASSUMPTIONS .
1. Scope. The scope of the thesis will include the Functional
Area 97 population of the Acquisition Corps, and will largely
disregard the FA 51 and FA 53 officers as the nature and specific
functions associated with their jobs differs significantly from
that of the FA 97 officers. Additionally, the focus is on the FA
97 procurement billets within Department of the Army organizations
(e.g. AMC) , and will, for the most part, exclude the positions in
Department of Defense contract administration agencies (e.g. DLA)
.
2. Limitations. The research will be limited by the fact that
the Acquisition Corps is still in its relative infancy because it
is only two years old. There will therefore be a relative dearth
of historical data or prior research on the Acquisition Corps
itself as an organizational entity. This fact will be mitigated to
some extent by the fact that there has been abundant research
conducted with reference to the functions performed by the
acquisition community prior to the establishment of the Acquisition
Corps. Consequently a large amount of this prior research will be
applicable to the research undertaken here.
3. Assumptions. The following assumptions will be used in
preparing the thesis report.
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a. Any reader of the thesis is assumed to have a
fundamental understanding of the Defense Department and Army in
general, and at least a surface familiarity with the procedures and
functions associated with the acquisition community.
b. It is assumed that the provisions of the Defense
Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA) will remain in force
indefinitely.
c. It is assumed that the Army Acquisition Corps (in
terms of relative size and composition) , as well as the current
organization of the Army acquisition community (i.e. the Army
Materiel Command and its subordinate Major Commands) , will remain
fundamentally unchanged for the foreseeable future.
E. DEFINITIONS AND ABBREVIATIONS.
A complete list of pertinent abbreviations and acronyms is
provided at Appendix A. Several key terms, however, are shown
below.
1. AAC: Army Acquisition Corps. "A combined, specialized
corps of military and civilian acquisition professionals..."
designed to "...capitalize on the operational experience of the
military officers and technical skills of the civilians." [25:
pp. 1-2
]
2. AMC: Army Materiel Command. A four-star General Officer
level command that is subordinate to the Chief of Staff of the Army
(CSA), it is the headquarters for the Army buying, or "systems,"
commands (e.g. TACOM, MICOM, etc.). The primary missions for AMC
involve providing functional/matrix support to the PEO/PM
11
organizations, and providing program/commodity management for non-
PEO/PM managed programs (i.e. mature programs). [10]
3. Branch: A "...grouping of officers which comprises an arm
or service of the Army and in which an officer is commissioned
,
transferred, trained, developed, and promoted." [24.: p. 6]
4. CMF: Career Management Field. A CMF is "... a grouping of
duty positions made up of skills and requirements which are
mutually supporting and culminate in the development of officers
skills necessary to perform at the LTC or COL level." [24.: p. 6]
5. DAWIA: Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act.
Chapter 87, Title XII, Public Law 101-510. This act was attached
as a rider to the FY 91 Defense Authorization Act [16: p. 2].
6. FA: Functional Area. "A grouping of officers by career
field other than arm, service, or branch that possess an
interrelated grouping of tasks or skills which usually requires
significant education, training, and experience." [24: p. 7]
7. FA 97: Functional Area 97-Contracting and Industrial
Management. An FA 97 officer is "...responsible for overall
development, implementation, management, direction and control of
procurement programs, program planning and general supervision of
major procurement activities....". Additionally, an FA 97 officer
is often "...warranted to legally obligate the U.S. Government" by
entering into contractual agreements with private contractors. [24:
p. 91]
8. MACOM: Major Command. The term MACOM refers to Major
subordinate commands and varies based on the context in which it is
12
used. In the context of this thesis the term refers to the
systems, or buying, commands directly subordinate to AMC.
9. PEO/PM: Program Executive Officer/Program Manager. A PEO
is a two-star level organization that is directly subordinate to
the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Research, Development, and
Acquisition (ASA-RDA) . There are numerous PEO organizations that
provide oversight of critical programs that fall within their area
of concentration. The AMC buying commands provide matrix support
to the PEO/PMs throughout the life cycle of an acquisition program.
10. User (operational) experience: The Webster 7 s Dictionary
defines operational as an "adj. of or connected with an operation,
esp. a military one..." [26: p. 703], and experience as a "n. the
knowledge or feeling obtained through direct impressions//the skill
or judgment gained by practice...." [26: p. 332]. In instructing
the AMC MACOMs to prepare validation documents for the AAC billets,
PERSCOM told the MACOMs to assign each position a Military
Essentiality Reason (MER) code which would be based on a
requirement for "...experience of a first-hand nature acquired by
participating in or conducting military operations, tactics, or
systems operations" [11: p. 8]. For the purposes of this thesis,
user experience is defined as the knowledge, skill, or judgment
gained through the practice or conduct of military operations.
F. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY.
Chapter II (Background) will discuss the following three major
areas. The historical development of the current Army Acquisition
13
Corps to include an examination of DAWIA. The organization of the
Army Materiel Command (AMC) and the Program Executive Officer (PEO)
structure which, together, comprise the Army acquisition community.
The tasks/functions, and types of assignments for FA 97 officers.
Chapter III (Research Methodology) will describe the personal
interviews as well as the rationale behind, and strategy for,
conducting the written survey of senior Acquisition Corps officers.
Chapter IV (Data Presentation and Analysis) will provide a
synopsis of the salient findings of the personal interviews, a
summary of the raw survey results, and a statistical analysis of
the survey results in order to ascertain whether the results favor
or disfavor a preference for user experience.
Chapter V (Discussion) will focus on interpretations of the
intent of the literature/documents with regards to preference for
user experience, as well as a discussion on how the statistical
analysis of the survey results can be interpreted in terms of a
preference for user experience.
Chapter VI (Conclusions and Recommendations) will discuss the
conclusions that can be made based on the analysis and will
recommend indicated changes or modifications to the current FA 97
organization with specific regard to branch coding FA 97 billets.





In order to facilitate the discussion, we must first explore
the events leading to the formulation of an Army Acquisition Corps.
This chapter will specifically address the key events preceding
DAWIA; the key provisions and requirements imposed by DAWIA; the
organizational structures and missions of both the Army Materiel
Command (AMC) and the Program Executive Offices (PEOs) which
together comprise the majority of the Army Acquisition Corps; and
a description of the tasks/functions and assignment types of FA 97
officers.
B. STUDIES PRIOR TO DAWIA.
There have been numerous studies and events that examined the
military and Federal acquisition process and played a significant
role in leading to the circumstances surrounding the DAWIA
enactment. The paragraphs below provide a brief description of
several key events that preceded the DAWIA passage. These include
the recommendations of the Commission on Government Procurement,
issuance of Executive Order 12352, the issuance of the Federal
Acquisition Regulation, and the recommendations of the President's
Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management.
1. Commission on Government Procurement (COGP). The COGP was
chartered by Congress in 1969 to conduct a "...comprehensive
investigation of the government procurement process." [21,: p. 102]
The primary thrust of the commission's report (issued in 1972)
dealt with the establishment of the Office of Federal Procurement
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Policy (OFPP) to provide for centralized development and management
of procurement policy as part of an "...'integrated system for
effective management, control, and operation of the federal
procurement process.'" [21.] One of the key elements of the
recommended procurement system was steps to be taken to "... assure
professionalism in procurement and the availability of competent,
trained personnel." [21: p. 103] Ten years later, in 1982, the OFPP
issued a report proposing a Uniform Federal Procurement System
(UFPS) a feature of which would be a professional work force [21:
p. 32]
.
2. Presidential Executive Order 12352. President Reagan
issued this order in 1982 closely on the heels of the UFPS
proposal. In it the president directed, amongst other things, that
the heads of all executive agencies "establish career management
programs, covering the full range of personnel management
functions, that will result in a highly qualified, well managed
professional..." acquisition work force, and that a single federal
acquisition regulation be completed by the end of 1982 [2i: p. 377].
3 . Federal Acquisition Regulation ( FAR) . Despite the
Presidential edict it wasn't until 1984 that the OFPP, in
conjunction with the DOD, GSA, and NASA, issued the FAR. The
regulation is a comprehensive document that establishes detailed
policies and procedures to be followed in the conduct of all
government procurement processes. In terms of this thesis,
however, the FAR is relatively vague in terms of detailed
description/definition of requisite skills or knowledge for
16
contracting officers. It does define, functionally, what a
contracting officer does and it provides the following criteria for
use by officials in appointing contracting officers.
(a) Experience in Government contracting and
administration, commercial purchasing, or related fields;
(b) Education or special training in business
administration, law, accounting, engineering, or related
fields;
(c) Knowledge of acquisition policies and procedures,
including this and other applicable regulations;
(d) Specialized knowledge in the particular assigned
field of contracting; and
(e) Satisfactory completion of acquisition training
courses. [17: p. 1-9]
4. The President's Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense
Management. This commission, commonly known as the Packard
Commission, was appointed by President Reagan in 1985. Its purpose
was to conduct a broad examination of the DOD's command and control
system, and "...the administrative procedures for conducting the
acquisition and procurement programs." [21: p. 34] In its 1986
final report to the President the commission made almost twenty
recommendations concerning ways to eradicate the " . . .root causes of
defense problems." [18: p.l] One recommendation that is
particularly germane to this thesis, and which played a significant
role as an impetus for the DAWIA legislation, related to the
enhancement of the quality of the acquisition workforce. The
specific recommendation is shown below.
DOD must be able to attract and retain the caliber
of people necessary for a quality acquisition program.
Significant improvements should be made in the senior-
level appointment system. The Secretary of Defense
should have increased authority to establish flexible
personnel management policies necessary to improve
defense acquisition. An alternate personnel management
system should be established to include senior
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acquisition personnel and contracting officers as well as
scientists and engineers. Federal regulations should
establish business-related education and experience
criteria for civilian contracting personnel, which will
provide a basis for the professionalization of their
career paths. Federal law should permit expanded
opportunities for the education and training of all
civilian acquisition personnel. [19: p. 27]
5. Summary. It should be noted that the primary focus of the
majority of actions previous to DAWIA was the acquisition process
itself. The personnel performing the process were almost
universally an ancillary concern. The prior recommendations could
best be characterized as possessing little real substance.
Congressman Mavroules, chairman of the House Armed Services
Committee's Subcommittee on Investigations stated that the problem
was in implementing the recommendations. As he put it there had
"...been plenty of talk and lots of paper, but not much action."
[16: p. 18] The passage of DAWIA marked the first major action that
focused exclusively on acquisition personnel.
C. DAWIA.
The overriding purpose of the Defense Acquisition Workforce
Improvement Act, Public Law 101-510, Title XII (attached as a rider
to the Fiscal Year 1991 Defense Authorization Act), was to
"...mandate the creation of a professional acquisition work force
and corps within each of the military services and the defense
agencies." [16.: p. 16]
Prior to drafting the legislation the Subcommittee on
Investigations of the House Armed Services Committee conducted a
"...year-long review of the 'state of the acquisition work force'."
[16: p. 16] The study identified "...major gaps in the career
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development of acquisition personnel." [16: p. 17] Specifically the
study found that the civilian to military mix in the acquisition
community was unsatisfactory in terms of " . . . lonq-standing policies
to appoint civilians to positions not requiring a military
officer" ; the Services were not complying with Program Manager
tenure requirements; acquisition workforce education and training
programs were being poorly managed; and contracting officers were
woefully undereducated with "half of the people who work in
contracting..." lacking a college degree [16.: p. 17]. As a result
of the study findings the subcommittee decided that "...a
comprehensive program [was] needed to ensure required improvement
in the quality and professionalism of those individuals working in
acquisition positions..." and that DAWIA would "...address this
goal by establishing the framework for a career program..." for
personnel in the acquisition community [16: p. 17].
The five major subchapters of the legislation are: General
Authority and Responsibilities, Defense Acquisition Positions,
Acquisition Corps, Education and Training, and General Management
Provisions. Each area is briefly described in the following
paragraphs
.
1. General Authority and Responsibilities. This subchapter
mandates the establishment of the office of Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition (USDA) who "...shall carry out all powers,
functions, and duties of the Secretary of Defense with respect to
the acquisition workforce in the Department of Defense." [8:
s.1702] The chapter further mandates the creation of a Director of
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Acquisition, Education, Training, and Career Development
subordinate to the USDA as well as the establishment of Acquisition
Executives and Directors of Acquisition Career Management (DACMs)
in each of the Services [8: ss. 1703-1705] . In the Army this
requirement is met by the Assistant Secretary of the Army for
Research, Development, and Acquisition (ASA-RDA) under whom falls
a DACM for each of the military and civilian portions of the Army
Acquisition Corps.
2. Defense Acquisition Positions. Subchapter II of the law
identified specific position categories that had to be considered
as "acquisition positions". These included: Program Managers;
systems planning, research, development, engineering, and testing;
contracting; industrial property management; logistics managers;
quality control personnel; manufacturing/production managers;
business, cost estimating, budget, and audit personnel; education,
training, and career development; construction; and any personnel
involved in joint development/production with non-DOD agencies or
foreign governments [8: s.1640].
3. Acquisition Corps. This portion of DAWIA directed that
each service must establish a dedicated Acquisition Corps and
specified the selection criteria for Corps membership for any
member as well as selection criteria for Corps members filling
"critical positions." In general any member of an Acquisition
Corps must be an 0-4/GS-13 or higher, possess a bachelor's degree,
and have a minimum of four years of acquisition experience.
Critical positions were mandated to include PEOs, PMs/Deputy PMs,
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and senior contracting officials and any person filling a critical
position billet must be an 0-5/GS-14 or higher in grade.
Additionally the law specified detailed assignment and previous
experience requirements for any person serving in a critical
acquisition position. For critical contracting positions the
person must be assigned for a minimum of three years and must have
no less than four years prior experience in contracting
assignments. The PMs/DPMs must have eight years prior acquisition
experience while PEOs must have ten years with at least four being
in a critical position. [8: ss. 1644-1646]
4. Education and Training. This subchapter simply directs
the Secretary of Defense to establish specific educational and
training programs in order to facilitate the career development of
acquisition personnel. Specifically it requires the establishment
of an intern , cooperative education, and scholarship program to
identify, train, fund, and educate potential acquisition corps
candidates. It further mandates the creation of a Defense
Acquisition University structure to oversee the "...professional
educational development and training of the acquisition
workforce..." and the "...research and analysis of defense
acquisition policy issues...." [8: s.1653]
5. General Management Provisions. The final portion of the
law directed the SECDEF to emplace a management information system
that would be "...capable of providing standardized information to
the Secretary on persons serving in acquisition positions." [8:
s.1653] This subchapter further required several detailed reports
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that the DOD must provide to Congress annually on the status of
DOD's compliance with DAWIA.
D. DAWIA' S IMPACT ON THE ARMY ACQUISITION CORPS.
The most significant impact DAWIA had, in terms of the
management of the AAC, was the specific prior-experience
requirements for personnel serving in both the acquisition corps in
general and specifically in critical acquisition positions. Prior
to the passage of DAWIA officers would "dual track" by alternately
serving assignments in their primary branch and their functional
area (e.g. an Infantry officer with a functional area 97
designation would serve an initial assignment in an FA 97 billet
and then return to an Infantry assignment) . Based on the
requirements (as outlined in Subchapter III of the Act) it was
decided that the prior dual track method was untenable because
officers would be unable to meet the DAWIA requirements on the one
hand, while damaging their promotion potential on the other hand
due to the length of time an officer would have to "be away" from
his/her basic branch. The result was the establishment of the Army
Acquisition Corps as a one-way street, if you will, in which
officers would enter the AAC at approximately their eighth year of
service (typically as a Captain) and then remain in the AAC for the
duration of their careers.
E. ARMY MATERIEL COMMAND/PROGRAM EXECUTIVE OFFICERS.
The three major structures in which FA 97 officers serve are
the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), the Army Materiel Command
(AMC), and the Program Executive Officer (PEO) structure. The DLA
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provides post-award contract administration services through
Defense Contract Management Districts (DCMDs) , Area Operations
(DCMAOs), and resident Defense Plant Representative Offices
(DPROs). Since the focus of this thesis is on pre-award
Procurement Contracting Officer billets in the Army buying
commands, as opposed to the Administrative Contracting Officer
billets found in DLA, we will not explore the roles and functions
of DLA any further. The AMC and PEO structures and missions along
with a discussion of how the two interrelate is presented below.
1. Army Materiel Command. In the most fundamental terms
AMC's mission is to research, develop, acquire, and
sustain/maintain supplies and services for the United States Army.
Functionally this translates to providing program management of
mature, non-major acquisition systems and equipment; providing
functional/matrix support to PEOs and their respective Program
Managers; and conducting technical research to develop new
technology [10] . AMC is organized to accomplish its mission
through eight major subordinate commands (MACOMs) under whom are
fifty-two additional organizations. Each of the MACOMs and their
associated sub-units are oriented to specific commodity groupings
so that each MACOM is responsible for a unique commodity line [ 9 ]
.
An organizational chart depicting the AMC MACOMs and a chart
showing the MACOM commodity groupings are shown on the following
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Figure 6. AMC MACOM Organization. Source [9]
AMC MACOM Compr>ri il-y Breakdown.
a) U.S. Army Armament , Munitions , & Chemical Command
(AMCCOM) : weapons and ammunition, nuclear and nonnuclear
munitions, weapons systems and support equipment, fire
control equipment, rocket and missile warhead sections,
demolition munitions, mines, bombs, grenades,
pyrotechnics, boosters, offensive and defensive chemical
materiel, and flame and incendiary systems.
h) U.S. Army Aviation and Troop Command (ATCOM) :
aircraft, aircraft engines, structural components and
ground support equipment, watercraft, marine and railroad
transportation, electric power generators, bridging and
stream crossing, water purification, air conditioning and
heating, camouflage, countermines, fuel and fuel handling
equipment, clothing, body armor, footwear, food, food
service equipment, tentage, parachutes, and air delivery
equipment.
c) U.S. Army Communications & Electronic Command (CECOM) :
communications, communications electronics intelligence
equipment, electronic warfare, aviation electronics,
combat surveillance, target acquisition and night vision
equipment, photographic and microfilming equipment,
identification friend or foe systems, automatic data
processing, radar, meteorological and electronic
radiological detection materiel, batteries, and electric
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power supply equipment.
dl U.S. Army Depot System Command ( DESC0M1 : operates Army
depots in the receipt, storage, issue, maintenance, and
disposal of assigned commodities.
e) U.S. Army Research Laboratory fARLl : conducts a broad
based multidisciplinary program of scientific research
and advanced technology directed toward new and improved
materials, components, subsystems, techniques and
processes
.
f) U.S. Army Missile Command (MICOM) : free rockets,
guided missiles, ballistic missiles, targets, air
defense, fire control coordination equipment, related
special purpose and multisystem test equipment, missile
launching and ground support equipment, Army missile
systems and laser weapons.
g) U.S. Army Tank-Automotive Command f TAC0M1 : combat,
tactical, special purpose vehicles (e.g. automotive
systems, engines, transmissions, armor materials),
carriers (e.g. personnel, cargo, missile, and rearm),
trailers, tractors, the Armed Forces vehicle fleet,
construction equipment, material handling equipment, and
tactical vehicles for the DOD and foreign allies.
h) U.S. Army Test & Evaluation Command (TEC0M1 : manages
proving grounds, installations, boards, and facilities
required to test equipment, weapons, and materiel
systems; to plan and conduct tests of materiel intended
for use by the Army.
Figure 7. AMC MACOM Commodity Groupings. Source: [9]
2. Program Executive Officers. The Department of Defense
manages the acquisition of supplies and equipment (above the small
purchase threshold) , through the use of Acquisition Programs which
are " . ..directed, funded efforts that are designed to provide a new
or improved materiel capability" to fulfill an identified need [23:
p. 15-2]. Each program is managed by a Program Manager (PM) who in
turn reports to a Program Executive Officer (PEO). In some cases
a PM may report to a MACOM commander (usually for mature, non-
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developmental programs), or directly to the ASA-RDA (for programs
deemed to be especially critical for the Army) . PEO is defined as
"a military or civilian official who has primary responsibility for
directing several .. .programs" . [23.: p. 15-14] The chain of command
for PEOs and PMs "...extends from a DOD component Acquisition
Executive through Program Executive Offices to individual Program
Managers." [.22: p. 1-7] In the Army Acquisition Corps, PEOs are
organized along commodity groupings much in the same was as the AMC
MACOMs. As of this writing there are twelve Program Executive
Officers in the PEO structure. The chart below identifies each PEO
and representative samples of each one's key acquisition programs.
PEO Structure
a) PEO Air Defense : Air-to-air missiles; Avenger air defense
system; Patriot; Anti-tactical missile defense; Forward area
air defense sensors and target identification office.
b) PEO Armaments : Paladin howitzer; 9mm pistol; Sense and
destroy armor (SADARM); Tank main armaments system.
c) PEO Armored Systems Modernization : Abrams tank; M1A1 tank;
Bradley fighting vehicle; Armored gun system (AGS); Combat
mobility vehicle.
dl PEO Aviation : Advanced attack helicopter; Avionics;
Aircraft survivability equipment; Comanche; Kiowa warrior;
Longbow weapon system for the Apache; CH-47 modernization.
el PEO Combat Support : Heavy tactical vehicles; Light tactical
vehicles; Medium tactical vehicles.
f) PEO Command and Control Systems : Air Defense command and
control systems; All source analysis system; Communications
processing and interface module; Strategic command and control
software; Combat terrain information system.
a) PEO Communication Systems : Army data distribution system;
Global positioning system (GPS) ; Mobile subscriber equipment
(MSE) ; Communications management systems; Sattelite
communications (SATCOM); Single channel ground and airborne
systems (SINCGARS); Universal modem.
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h) PEO Fire Support : Air-to-ground missiles; Hellfire missile
system; Army tactical missile system (ATACMS) ; Javelin
missile; Multiple launch rocket system (MLRS); Bradley-TOW
subsystem.
i) PEO Intelligence and Electronic Warfare : Guardrail/common
sensor; Stingray laser; Joint surveillance target attack radar
system (JSTARS); Night vision electro optics; Radar;
Firefinder; Signals warfare; Tactical jammer.
j 1 PEO Standard Army Management Information Systems :
Integrated logistics systems; Army food management information
system; Standard Army ammunition system; Standard Army retail
supply system; Standard property book system.
kl PEO Strategic Defense : Anti-sattelite (ASAT) ; Ballistic
missile defense; Ground based interceptor; Ground based
surveillance and tracking system; High endoatmospheric defense
interceptor; Hypervelocity launcher.
1) PEO Cruise Missiles Project/Unmanned Aerial Vehicles :
(Joint Project); Army unmanned aerial vehicles; Unmanned
aerial vehicles joint program.
Source: [10]
3. AMC/PEO interface. The most significant ingredient in the
AMC to PEO relationship is the fact that the chain of command for
AMC originates with the Chief of Staff of the Army while each PEO
reports directly to the Assistant Secretary of the Army for
Research, Development, and Acguisition. The AMC MACOMs provide
functional support to the PEO structure for contracting,
engineering, cost analysis, test and evaluation, transportation,
and quality assurance. While the PEOs maintain a core staff of PMs
they contract for functional support from the AMC MACOMs, or buying
commands as they are often called. Traditionally a PM will develop
a support plan for his/her respective program and, essentially,
negotiate a contract, or agreement, with the buying command that
has primary responsibility for the commodity group into which the
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program is categorized (e.g, PM Abrams Tank will turn to TACOM for
support on a developmental tank program) . The agreement will then
be signed by both the PEO and the Commanding General of the buying
command. In the example above the PEO Armored Systems
Modernization and the CG TACOM. [10] The PEO-AMC relationship is
depicted graphically in Figure 8 below.
PEO Structure AMC Organization
ASA-RDA CSA
PEO AMC
PM ************* AMC MACOM
*** = Functional Support.
Figure 8. PEO-AMC Relationship. Source: [10]
F. FUNCTIONAL AREA 97 OFFICERS.
The FA 97 Contracting and Industrial Management officer is one
of the three functional areas comprising the Army Acguisition
Corps. The Federal Acguisition Regulation (FAR) states that a
"'Contracting officer' is a person with the authority to enter
into, administer , and/or terminate contracts and make related
determinations and findings." [17: p. 2-1] The Army describes an FA
97 as an officer that is typically warranted to establish
contractual relationships with private contractors and as an
officer that is primarily involved in the letting and administering
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of the procurement end of an acquisition action (as opposed to the
requirements generation) . The paragraphs below will provide a
description of the types of functions/tasks usually performed by FA
97s as well as the kinds of assignments available to FA 97
officers.
1. FA 97 tasks. We turn to the FAR again and find that in
identifying the generic responsibilities of a contracting officer
it provides the following description.
Contracting officers are responsible for ensuring
performance of all necessary actions for effective
contracting, ensuring compliance with the terms of the
contract, and safeguarding the interests of the United
States in its contractual relationships. In order to
perform these responsibilities, contracting officers
should be allowed wide latitude to exercise business
judgment. [17: p. 1-8]
The following is a bulletized list of the tasks routinely
performed by FA 97s as identified in the Army's manual,
Commissioned Officer Professional Development and Utilization .
a) Negotiation and contracting for commodities,
facilities, systems, construction, maintenance and
services.
b) Analyzing/determining suitability of requests for
purchase
.
c) Recommending/determining proper procurement and
contractual methods.
d) Preparing formal contracts and insuring all
Government terms/specifications/legal requirements and
restrictions are incorporated and met as appropriate.
e) Initiating/administering invitations for bid,
requests for proposal/solicitations to industry.
f) Conducting extensive managerial, industrial and
financial capability analyses/evaluations.
g) Awarding, administering, managing and terminating
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Government contracts.
h) Conducting technical analyses of contractor
manufacturing/production program methods and other
associated capabilities.
i) Conducting major systems acquisition "should
cost"/"production readiness" reviews prior to contract
negotiation and award.
j) Managing government/industrial production
activities.
k) Managing quality/product assurance and insuring
delivery is in conformance with contractual requirements
and specifications.
1) Forecasting procurement program cost/budget.
m) Selecting, formulating and reviewing contract
type.
n) Evaluating in process contractual reviews.
o) Implementing/managing analyses of systems/program
management and management engineering. [24.: pp 5-9]
2- Assignments for FA 97 officers. The following paragraphs
are quoted again from the Army's Commissioned Officer Professional
Development and Utilization manual and depict the types of
assignments in which FA 97 officers can expect to serve in the Army
Acquisition Corps.
Command an Army Procurement Agency, Defense Contract
Management District (DCMD) , Defense Contract Management
Area of Operations (DCMAO) , Defense Plant Representative
Office (DPRO), or be a Project/Product Manager (PM) or
serve as a Senior Contracting Official.
Serve as a procurement staff officer, contracting
officer, Assistant or Deputy PM, program integrator,
fielding officer, or procurement and production control
officer, managing and directing procurement and/or
production activities at HQDA, U.S. Army Materiel Command
(AMC) , other Army MACOMs, Joint Duty Assignments or the
Defense Logistics Agency (DLA).
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Serve as a contract specialist , or contract
administrator. [24: p. 2]
G. SUMMARY.
This chapter identified the significant events preceding the
enactment of the Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act
(DAWIA), the key provisions of the DAWIA itself, the missions and
organizational structures of the Army Materiel Command and Program
Executive Officer systems, and provided a description of the
functions/tasks and assignment types associated with Army FA 97
Contracting and Industrial Management officers.
Taken in the aggregate this chapter purported to establish the
groundwork, if you will, for the environment in which the actual
thesis research was conducted. In other words, it was in the
climate described above, that the attempt was made to ascertain to
what extent user experience should play a part in the assignment of
FA 97 officers performing the tasks identified above, and serving
in the DAWIA generated Army Acquisition Corps' billets, located in




The two major portions of the research included personal
interviews and a survey questionnaire. Chronologically, there were
two key interviews that launched the research process, followed by
the mailing of the survey questionnaires, and then the conduct of
additional personal interviews at Headquarters, Department of the
Army (HQDA) . Each of these steps is discussed below.
B. INITIAL PERSONAL INTERVIEWS.
The purpose of the initial interviews was to ascertain whether
or not branch coding of FA 97 billets was feasible, and to
determine how "receptive" the personnel/policy managers at
Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA) were to the notion of
a heavier reliance on branch coding. During the initial interviews
the then branch chief of the Military Acquisition Management Branch
(MAMB) , LTC Knight, in PERSCOM, as well MAJ Linehan, an officer
assigned to the Director of Acquisition Career Management's (DACM)
office were both interviewed.
a) MAMB. During this interview LTC Knight warned the
author that there might be an element of parochialism present in
the FA 97 community due to the fact that, historically, the FA 97
population had been composed of primarily Ordnance and
Quartermaster officers and consequently the current population of
senior officers (0-5s and 0-6s) in the FA 97 community was
disproportionately comprised of these types of officers. He felt
that there might be some potential for these officers to "skew"
their responses to the survey towards a decreased reliance on
branch coding in order to "protect" their branch. In other words,
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the branch chief thought that non-combat arms officers might
"slant" any statements they made in an attempt to "protect" their
branch's participation in the AAC.
The most significant upshot of LTC Knight's comments was that
the idea of an increased reliance on branch coding FA 97 billets
was probably worthwhile but that it would be something that would
have to be carefully explored first. He stated that it would not
be a simple matter of looking at the branch composition of the
population and then coding FA 97 billets to reflect this
composition, but would rather have to be an action that was
primarily driven by the MACOMs as they were best qualified to
identify which specific billets would, or would not, require a
branch specific officer. LTC Knight also stated that, in terms of
branch coding, the initial MAPL had been built with each MACOM
responsible for identifying billets for branch coding. [14]
b) DACM. The interview with MAJ Linehan (an 0-4/FA 51
officer) in the DACM's office can best be characterized as somewhat
hostile to any idea involving a heavier reliance on branch coding
of FA 97 billets for Combat Arms, or for any branch for that
matter. Major Linehan stated that the author "...should forget
your Special Forces experience and pack away your BDUs (Battle
Dress Uniform) because anybody can do the job of a Contracting
Officer; you don't need operational experience." [15] He stated in
no uncertain terms that, in his opinion, anybody can do the job of
a contracting officer and that any notion of an increased reliance
on branch coding is a "...waste of time." Major Linehan further
stated that the requirements document generation is where the most
important acquisition work is done because if the requirements
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documentation is done correctly the task of the contracting officer
is simply to draft and let a contract that fulfills the specific
requirements identified in the Statement of Work/Procurement
Request. [15]
In short, the initial interviews left a clear impression that
there was a significant degree of intransigence at the




The survey was conducted in order to objectively measure the
level of command preference for user experience on the part of FA
97 officers. The method for selecting the survey recipients
(target audience) , and constructing the actual questionnaire
(survey design) are presented in the following paragraphs.
1. Target Audience. Given the potentially hostile
atmosphere, it was decided that the best strategy for conducting
the survey would be to determine the level of command preference
for user's experience. A critical factor in pursuing this strategy
was to preempt any claim of sampling error, or survey variance, by
surveying a statistically significant number of senior officers in
the Acquisition Corps.
With this strategy in mind, a target audience was selected
using Lieutenant Colonels and Colonels (0-5s/0-6s) currently
serving in the AAC and including the entire FA 97 population as
well as all FA 51s serving in Program Management (PM) or Program
Executive Officer (PEO) billets. The latter groups were included
so as to gauge the extent to which PMs and PEOs prefer to have a
supporting PCO staff that has user familiarity with the Program
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equipment (e.g. would a PM for a new helicopter prefer to have a
PCO that had operational experience with helicopters)
.
The starting point for identifying specific survey
participants was a PERSCOM provided roster of the 805 0-5s and 0-6s
currently serving in the Acquisition Corps. Eliminating the FA 53s
left 708 FA 97s and FA 51s from which to select the survey
audience. A target sample was then built using the following
criteria: all FA 97s in CONUS billets, FA 51s in PM billets, and FA
51s in PEO billets. The ultimate target audience consisted of 343
officers that met the criterion above. An attempt was then made to
telephonically contact each officer on the list in order to
determine their mailing address. Additionally, it was hoped that
telephoning each officer before sending the survey would serve to
enhance the ultimate response rates for the survey. Of the 343
officers on the initial target audience roster, 175 (51%) were
contacted and identified as survey recipients. The 168 officers
that did not receive surveys were deleted from the list due to
retirement, pending or recent reassignment, an inability to
locate/contact the officer, or an unwillingness to participate. Of
the 175 surveys mailed out, 75 were sent to FA 97s and 100 were
sent to FA 51s. Roughly 75% of recipients responded with 130
completed survey questionnaires being returned to the author. A
total of 56 FA 97s and 74 FA 51s responded. A profile of the
survey recipients and respondents is illustrated in Figures 9 and
10 on the following page.
2. Survey Sample Size. The question that then posed itself
was whether or not the response rate provided a large enough sample
so as to mitigate or eliminate any potential claims of sampling
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Figure 10. SURVEY RESPONDENTS BY BASIC BRANCH
error. In other words, the question was whether or not the survey
sample was of sufficient size to provide a clear and reliable
indication of the responses that would have been given if the
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entire AAC population had been surveyed. A college statistics
textbook states that "...we will consider sample sizes of 30 or
more (n > 30) large enough ... provide an adequate approximation for
the probability distribution..." of the sample mean [27: p. 363].
The book also provides a procedure by which we can accurately
determine the requisite sample size needed to meet a set of
predetermined accuracy criteria.
In order to calculate the required size we must use a standard
deviation, a preselected maximum allowable error factor, and a
predetermined confidence level. In this case the author chose to
use the largest standard deviation obtained in any of the nine
scaled statements. This was done because the largest standard
deviation is indicative of the statement most prone to error and
consequently will require the largest sample size in order to
achieve the desired confidence level. The maximum allowable error
selected was + 0.25 points from the sample mean, while the
confidence level utilized was 95%.
The largest standard deviation obtained (i.e. the statement
that drew the widest disparity of responses on the 1 to 5 bar
scale), was a standard deviation of 1.1761 on statement 2a. Using
this value (1.1761), a 95% confidence level, and a maximum
allowable error of ± 0.25, the calculation yielded a required
sample size of 86 respondents. In plain English this means that it
takes a sample size of at least 86 respondents to be 95% certain
that the true population mean will vary no more than one quarter of
a point in either direction of the mean obtained in the sample.
In short, the sample size of 130 is more than adequate to be
able to claim that the scores obtained in this survey are reliably
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representative of the entire Army Acquisition Corps population of
0-5s and 0-6s. [27.: p. 389-393]
3. Survey Design. There were two major concerns in
constructing the actual survey questionnaire. The first was to
design the survey so as to produce objective results that would
allow for statistical analysis. The second was to pose the
questions/statements in a manner that would eliminate potential
bias in terms of the previously discussed intransigence that the
author had been warned about. An ancillary concern was a desire to
provide a forum for respondents to provide comments with regards to
the topic. A survey questionnaire, as it was mailed to the survey
population, is shown at Appendix B.
With these concerns in mind the questionnaire was designed
with three major sections. The first was simply general
demographical and historical data on the respondent. There were
two purposes for this section. The first was to identify the
amount of acquisition experience the respondent had so as to ensure
that their comments/responses were credible. The second was to
facilitate additional statistical analysis of the responses through
correlation of responses with rank, basic branch, functional area,
time in the acquisition community, or MACOM.
The second section of the survey consisted of scaled responses
to a series of statements with which respondents could answer in
one of only five ways: strongly disagree, disagree, neither agree
nor disagree, agree, and strongly agree. Each possible answer was
placed on a bar scale and assigned a value with "strongly disagree"
being a "1", through "strongly agree" being a "5". In addition, a
block was provided for respondents to check-mark if they made
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statements amplifying their scored answer, and a blank space was
left at the end of section two for the written comments. The bar
scale as it appeared on the questionnaire is shown below.
2a: REMARKS MADE12 3 4 5
< ->
STRONGLY DISAGREE NEITHER AGREE AGREE STRONGLY
AGREE NOR DISAGREE AGREE
Each of the statements were designed with an eye towards
characterizing responses as either directly favoring, or
disfavoring, the need or preference for user experience. Seven of
the nine statements were phrased so that an "agree" type response
favored user experience, while, conversely, an "agree" type score
on the other two statements disfavored user experience.
The third, and final, section of the questionnaire was
composed of a series of five open-ended questions relating to
whether or not there should be a heavier emphasis placed on branch
coding FA 97 positions. Each question provided the respondent with
an opportunity to check a "yes" or "no" block, and/or provide
written comments in a blank space that followed each question. The
intent was to review the written comments in order to identify any
salient themes or ideas that appeared repeatedly.
D. SECOND SET OF INTERVIEWS.
The second set of interviews was conducted during a visit to
HQDA subsequent to the initiation of the survey. The purpose of
this iteration was to gather background information on how the
initial MAPL had been built and to determine how a policy of
increased branch coding could be implemented in terms of the
mechanics of the actual assignments procedures used by PERSCOM. In
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all cases the interviewees were not members of the survey sample.
This was intentionally done so as not to "taint" the sample.
E. SUMMARY.
This chapter provided a discussion of the rationale behind the
major methods involved in performing the thesis research namely the
personal interviews and the survey questionnaires. It briefly
identified the purpose and results of the initial interviews and
explored the consequences of a heavier reliance branch coding.
Additionally, it identified the need for a second set of personal
interviews to explore the factors that would be involved in
implementing a policy of increased reliance on branch coding. The
following chapter will present the summarized results of both sets
of interviews as well as the raw data gathered by the survey along
with a statistical analysis of said data.
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IV. DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS
A. GENERAL.
The results of the two major research activities, survey
questionnaires and personal interviews, are presented in this
chapter. A statistical analysis of the questionnaire results is
provided along with a synopsis of the interviews.
B. SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE.
1. Scaled Response Data. The strategy used to accumulate and
analyze the scaled responses was to treat each of the nine
statements as an independent hypothesis. The bar scale used for
each of the statements in this section of the survey is reproduced
below for the reader's reference. Each respondent indicated
his/her response by circling one of the scores on the bar. The
responses were then tallied to determine the mean response for each
statement
.
12 3 4 5
< >
STRONGLY DISAGREE NEITHER AGREE AGREE STRONGLY
DISAGREE NOR DISAGREE DISAGREE
There are four primary values reported below for each
statement: the mean score; the standard deviation; the P-score; and
the 95% confidence range. Using the classical hypothesis approach
the "null hypothesis" (H ) for each statement was that H = 3.0, or
that respondents neither agreed nor disagreed with the statement.
The alternative hypothesis (Ha ) varied with each statement based on
how the answer was interpreted in terms of favoring a preference
for user experience. For example, an alternative hypothesis of Ha
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> 3.0 would be used for a statement in which a positive answer
(i.e. AGREE or STRONGLY AGREE) favored user experience, and
conversely, an alternative hypothesis of Ha < 3.0 would be used for
a statement in which a negative response (i.e. DISAGREE or STRONGLY
DISAGREE) favored a preference for user experience. The mean
response score of each statement was then evaluated using a P-value
decision criterion test which states that if "...the P-value is
less than or egual to the specified significance level, then reject
the null hypothesis" and accept the alternative hypothesis [27:
p. 450]. Under the P-value approach a lower P-score indicates a
stronger tendency towards the alternative hypothesis. The
threshold for deciding at what point to accept or reject the null
hypothesis was determined by applying a 5% significance level
(corresponding to a 95% confidence level of the mean score
accuracy) meaning that the P-score must be less than or equal to
.05 in order to accept the alternative hypothesis. The final
evaluation reported here is the confidence interval which depicts
the range into which we can be 95% confident that the true
population mean falls, given the sample size, standard deviation,
and a 5% significance level. The chart on the following page




MEAN SCORE STD DEV P-SCORE CI RANGE
2a 2.898 1.1761 0.16 2.69-3.10
2b 4.188 0.6845 0.00 4.07-4.31
2c 2.742 1.124 0.005 2.55-2.94
2d 3.929 0.9735 0.00 3.76-4.10
2e 3.555 0.9459 0.00 3.39-3.72
2f 2.820 1.0754 0.03 2.63-3.01
2g 4.188 0.8395 0.00 4.04-4.33
2h 3.281 1.0569 0.01 3.10-3.47
2i 4.578 0.6943 0.00 4.46-4.70
Figure 11: SUMMARIZED SURVEY RESPONSE DATA.
2. Detailed Statement Results. The summarized raw responses
to each of the nine statements in section two of the survey
questionnaire are provided on the following pages. Each paragraph
shows the statement as it appeared on the survey and a graphical
depiction of the summarized responses. The mean of the responses,
the standard deviation for the scores, the P-score, and the
Confidence Interval (CI) range are all repeated below each graph.
Additionally the alternative hypothesis (Ha ) used for each
statement is identified. Finally, a narrative analysis of the
statement response results follows each graph. The purpose of the
narrative analysis is to describe in words how the author
determined the alternative hypothesis that was to be used for each
statement. This process essentially boiled down to a "what if..."
drill in which the question of "What if the sample says...X?" or
"What if the sample says...Y?" was addressed in terms of what the
answer would mean with regards to favoring a preference for user
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experience. Additionally, the scaled responses plus the
respondents' written comments to each statement are analyzed in
terms of how they can be interpreted in terms of the hypothesis
acceptance/rejection and their impact on favoring or disfavoring a
preference for user experience on the part of contracting officers.
The written comments are reproduced in their entirety in Appendix
C.
a) Statement 2a. User experience is required on the part
of a cognizant contracting officer in order for him/her to
effectively perform his/her duties.
12 3
BAR SCALE RESPONSES
FIGURE 12: RESPONSES TO STATEMENT 2a,
Mean score: 2.898
Standard Deviation: 1.1761
Alternative hypothesis: Ha > 3.0
P-Score: 0.16
CI Range: 2.69-3.10
1) Statement 2a narrative analysis. The reason for the
selection of alternative hypothesis is somewhat obvious; a positive
44
response to this statement would clearly favor a requirement for
user experience. If the sample agreed that user experience is
required then we could safely state that there should be a policy
of coding billets to facilitate this requirement. If the sample
had disagreed then we could move to the next step and attempt to
ascertain whether or not there is a preference even though there is
not a requirement. The P-score, however, exceeds the 0.05
threshold and consequently the null hypothesis is accepted.
Therefore we must conclude that the AAC population in general would
neither agree nor disagree with this statement.
Nineteen respondents provided written remarks with this
statement. The comments generally followed the spread of the
scaled scores with five neither agreeing or disagreeing, five
disagreeing, and nine agreeing. The identifiable thrusts of the
comments were that user experience should be defined as any
military operational experience as opposed to specific branch-
related; and that the issue should be looked at on a "case-by-case
( contract-by-contract ) " basis
.
Based on the relatively even spread ,of scores across the
spectrum the only comment that can safely be made is that there are
apparently mixed emotions in response to this statement. In other
words there is no strong consensus within the AAC population with
regards to a requirement for user experience on the part of
contracting officers.
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b. Statement 2b. User experience would enhance the




FIGURE 13: RESPONSES TO STATEMENT 2b.
Mean score: 4.188
Standard Deviation: 0.6845
Alternative hypothesis: Ha > 3.0
P-Score : 0.00
CI Range: 4.07-4.31
1) Statement 2b narrative analysis. The alternative
hypothesis shown was chosen because a positive response to this
statement was viewed as favorable to a preference for user
experience. The thinking behind the statement construction was
that if respondents generally agreed with the statement, then the
argument could be made that if it (user experience) enhances
effectiveness it should be preferred. The assumption here was that
any organization will want to establish procedures/policies that
will enhance organizational effectiveness. If, on the other hand,
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the majority of respondents had disagreed we would have to conclude
that there ought not be any requirement for user experience in
coding contracting officer billets as the implication would be that
user experience actually has a detrimental impact on the
effectiveness of a contracting officer. In this case the P-score
is well under the threshold and the null hypothesis is rejected in
favor of the alternative hypothesis.
A review of the eight written comments shows that all were
provided by respondents who either agreed or strongly agreed with
the statement. The major themes of the written comments was that
while user experience was not required it is certainly beneficial
and that it goes a long way towards enhancing the credibility of
the contracting officer with the PM shop. Additionally, one
officer stated that the level of need for user experience,
"...while not in all cases necessary" it "...would be highly
desirable in some, and critical in others." In other words the
level of need for user experience will vary from billet to billet
within a command and that a "...a balance within an organization
would be best."
Based on the low P-score, the relatively high mean score of
almost 4.2 (almost 1.2 points beyond the "agree" level of 3.1), and
the thrust of the written comments, we can readily make the comment
that there is a strong consensus within the AAC population in terms
of agreeing that a contracting officer can better perform his/her
duties if he/she has prior operational experience with the types of
supplies and services that are being procured.
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c. Statement 2c. A contracting officer from another
service (i.e. a Navy, Air Force, or Marine Corps contracting
officer) would be just as effective serving in an Army buying
command billet, as would be an Army FA 97 officer.
2 3
BAR SCALE RESPONSES
FIGURE 14: RESPONSES TO STATEMENT 2c.
Mean score: 2.742
Standard Deviation: 0.9735
Alternative hypothesis: Ha < 3.0
P-score: 0.005
CI Range: 2.55-2.94
1) Statement 2c narrative analysis. The alternative
hypothesis was chosen because a negative response was viewed as
favorable to a preference for user experience. The rationale was
that if the sample disagreed with this statement then we could
infer that, at least at the Service level, there exists a
preference for user experience. The reverse of this rationale was
that, if the sample agreed, we would have to infer that, even at
the Service level , there is no preference for any kind of user
experience. The P-score on this statement is below the requisite
0.05 and we accept the alternative over the null hypothesis. This
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acceptance is mitigated by the fact that the mean score is only
0.26 points below the "disagree" level of 2.9, as well as the fact
that when we look at the graphical breakdown it is readily apparent
that a large number of respondents agreed with the statement.
The pattern of the written comments tends to support the
"reduction" of the level of confidence with which we can rely on
the findings here. Fifteen comments were provided with six
disagreeing, two neither agreeing or disagreeing, and seven
agreeing. The general theme of the modifying statements was that
while on the one hand service peculiar procedures are important,
the quality of the individual (as opposed to his/her service) and
an intimate working knowledge of the Federal Acquisition
Regulations are equally as important. In addition several
respondents commented that the use of joint service contracting
officers has worked in the past and therefore there is nothing
"wrong" with it.
Although we can conclude that the AAC population in general
disagrees with the statement, it must be pointed out that the level
of consensus on the issue can only be characterized as weak.
d. Statement 2d. When a contracting officer has user
experience with a proposed item it facilitates the preparation of
requirements documents (i.e. Statements of Work/Bid Packages).
[SEE FIGURE 15 ON FOLLOWING PAGE]
Mean score: 3.929 P-Score: 0.00
Standard Deviation: 0.9735 CI Range: 3.76-4.10
Alternative hypothesis: Ha > 3.0
1) Statement 2d narrative analysis. A positive response was
viewed as favorable to a preference for user experience which
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12 3 4 5
BAR SCALE RESPONSES
FIGURE 15: RESPONSES TO STATEMENT 2d.
resulted in the selection of the alternative hypothesis as shown.
If we could conclude, based on a positive sample response, that
user experience facilitates preparation of requirements
documentation then we could make the statement that there ought to
be a preference for user experience. The P-score is below the
threshold for null rejection and the alternative hypothesis is
accepted
.
The statement can safely be made that within the AAC
population of 0-5s and 0-6s there is a strong consensus of opinion
with regards to agreeing that user experience facilitates the pre-
award activities associated with the generation of requirements
documentation. Reviewing the written comments, however, mitigates
this statement somewhat.
Twelve statements were provided and the readily identifiable
50
recurring notion in both the positive, as well as negative,
statements was that contracting officers do not get involved in the
preparation of requirements documents. The PCO role is more one of
reviewing already prepared documents in order to prepare contract
solicitations. This tends to reduce the relative importance of the
specific findings with regards to this statement as it will
ultimately play a lesser role in resolving the question of whether
or not contracting officer user experience should be a factor in
assigning officers to billets in buying commands.
In other words, although there is a consensus on this
statement (albeit weak), in the end it won't much matter because,
regardless of the level of user experience, contracting officers
are a "non-factor" in the preparation of requirements documentation
because they don't see them until the documents are already
completed and hence they (contracting officers) have a minimal
impact on the process.
e. Statement 2e. It is safe to say that in the
acquisition community there is a desire for contracting officer
user experience, but not necessarily a need for this type of
operational experience,
[SEE FIGURE 16 ON THE FOLLOWING PAGE]
Mean score: 3.555 P-Score: 0.00
Standard Deviation: 0.9459 CI Range: 3.39-3.72
Alternative hypothesis: Ha > 3.0
1) Statement 2e narrative analysis. The reasoning behind the
alternative hypothesis selection should be relatively self-
explanatory. A positive response was viewed as favorable because
we would be able to conclude that, in terms of preference , there is
a consensus favoring it. Based on the P-score being well below the
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BAR SCALE RESPONSES
FIGURE 16: RESPONSES TO STATEMENT 2e.
0.05 threshold we accept the alternative hypothesis.
This statement can be described as somewhat of a hybrid of the
first two statements in this section in that the desire portion
stems from the belief that user experience makes a contracting
officer more effective (statement 2b) , while the need portion
refers to the requirement portion of statement 2a. The findings
tend to support the statement that within the AAC population there
does in fact exist a desire for contracting officer user
experience. Since the mean score exceeds the agree threshold by
only . 55 points the statement must be made that there is only a
moderate level of agreement with this statement. The five written
comments that were provided (one agree, one neither, and three
disagree) were too few and somewhat innocuous to allow for any
meaningful analysis.
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f . Statement 2f . By the time a procurement action reaches
the PCO level, the requirements definition is specific enough to
preclude a requirement for the contracting officer's user
familiarity with the item.
2 3
BAR SCALE RESPONSES
FIGURE 17: RESPONSES TO STATEMENT 2f
Mean score: 2.820
Standard Deviation: 1.0754
Alternative hypothesis: Ha < 3.0
P-Score: 0.03
CI Range: 2.63-3.01
1) Statement 2f narrative analysis. The alternative
hypothesis was selected because a negative response was viewed as
favorable to a preference for user experience. The thought process
behind the construction of the statement was that if the
requirements definition were specific enough then there would be no
need for user experience because user experience would provide no
"value added" and could then be characterized as frivolous.
Alternately, if the requirements definition were not specific
enough, then the PCO's user experience would prove to be beneficial
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to the procurement process and the requirement for his/her user
experience could then be described as a necessary factor in the
successful completion of a procurement action. Consequently a
left-tailed alternative hypothesis was chosen. The P-score is
below the . 05 threshold and the alternative hypothesis is
accepted. Because the mean score is only 0.28 points below the
disagree level we must conclude that, although there is a
consensus, it is a relatively weak one and it is worth noting that,
with regards to this statement, there are many people in the
general population that feel that a contracting officer's user
experience is of little import once an action is at the contracting
officer level. The written comments (twelve total) tend to support
this claim with the two "agree" type comments stating that a
procurement action is essentially a "done deal" by the time the
contracting staff becomes involved; and the ten "disagree" type
basically stating that, although it is not essential, another "set
of eyes" can't hurt.
g. Statement 2g. It has always been helpful for newly
assigned FA 97 officers to familiarize themselves with the items
being procured by their new command.
[SEE FIGURE 18 ON THE FOLLOWING PAGE]
Mean score: 4.188 P-Score: 0.00
Standard Deviation: 0.8395 CI Range: 4.04-4.33
Alternative hypothesis: Ha > 3.0
1) Statement 2g narrative analysis. The alternative
hypothesis was chosen because a positive response was deemed to be
favorable to a requirement for user experience. In this case the




FIGURE 18: RESPONSES TO STATEMENT 2g.
should familiarize themselves with the items being acquired this
implies that user experience is being introduced "post-assignment"
,
if you will. In other words, we could conclude that it is helpful
for officers to gain user familiarity after they are assigned to
the buying command. This would allow for the premise that officers
with operational experience gained through previous assignments in
their basic branch would already possess some level of familiarity
with the types of equipment being procured by the command. For
example, an aviation officer serving in an assignment with ATCOM
would already be intimately familiar with helicopters and
helicopter systems while a non-aviation officer would not. The P-
score is well below the 0.05 level and the alternative hypothesis
is accepted over the null. Because of the relatively high point
spread from the agree threshold (1.19 points over 3.0), it is safe
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to say that the AAC population in general believes that contracting
officers should take the time to become familiar with the supplies
that they will be involved in procuring. A quick look at the
graphics makes it readily apparent that the level of consensus on
this issue can be characterized as very strong. The written
comments generally support the statistical findings in that all
three state primarily the same thing; namely that contracting
officer familiarity with the items being purchased is critical if
the officer is to be effective in performing his/her job.
h. Statement 2h. The items procured by each of the
"buying commands" in AMC are generally of such a nature that the
operational users of the equipment or items will fall within
specific Career Management Fields.
12 3
BAR SCALE RESPONSES
FIGURE 19: RESPONSES TO STATEMENT 2h.
Mean score: 3.281
Standard Deviation: 1.0569




1) Statement 2h narrative analysis. The intent of this
statement was to ascertain whether or not a relationship existed
between AMC organization and branch type. A positive response
could be taken to imply that branch coding AMC billets could be
accomplished along AMC commodity lines. The alternative is
accepted based on the P-score being below the threshold. Taking
the picture presented by the graph together with the fact that the
mean only exceeds the agree level by 0.28 points it is clear that
the level of agreement with this statement can only be
characterized as moderate. In other words it appears that the AAC
population as a whole somewhat agrees, but not wholeheartedly, with
the idea that there is an identifiable relationship between the
items bought in buying commands and the soldiers that will
operationally use them. The written comments provide clear insight
into the source of this moderation.
A total of eighteen comments were provided and, regardless of
whether they disagreed or agreed, almost all of the statements
essentially said the same thing. Specifically they said that this
statement, as it is presented in the survey, is too general because
each of the buying commands' products are ultimately used by a wide
variety of soldiers in the field. For example, TACOM buys
trucks/wheeled vehicles that are put to use by all soldiers, or
radios purchased by CECOM are not restricted to any identifiable
CMF or grouping of CMFs.
One comment by the researcher is appropriate at this juncture.
In retrospect, the research results may have been better served by
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attempting to couch this statement in terms of the "primacy of
knowledge", or expertise, associated with the development and
procurement of a piece of equipment. Using a radio, which is
operationally used by all soldiers, as an example, the primacy of
expertise will clearly reside with a Signal Corps officer. A good
analogy may have been that while people all look at a watch to tell
the time, very few can provide detailed information on how to build
a clock. The bottom line, however, is that due to the nebulous
nature of this statement the results will be of little value in
addressing the primary focus of the thesis.
i. Statement 2i. One of the purposes of having a
uniformed presence in the Acquisition Corps is to bring operational













FIGURE 20: RESPONSES TO STATEMENT 2i.
Mean score: 4.578
Standard Deviation: 0.6943




1) Statement 2i narrative analysis. The P-score is well below
the threshold and the null is rejected in favor of the alternative
hypothesis. Based on the extremely high mean score (which is
abundantly clear in the graph) , we can conclude that there is an
overwhelming consensus throughout the AAC population with regards
to the idea that uniformed officers are in the Acquisition Corps to
utilize their previously developed user experience.
There were fourteen written comments to this statement which
were all "agree" type with the exception of one officer who neither
agreed nor disagreed because, as he put it, the number of uniformed
FA 97s is too small in relation to the total Acquisition Corps to
have a marked influence. The remaining thirteen comments were all
overwhelmingly positive in terms of agreeing with the statement.
Five respondents stated that, in their estimation, the biggest
contribution of the uniformed members of the AAC was a sense of
urgency and the leadership/management skills inherent in
commissioned officers.
In general it can be said that the overall "flavor" of the
comments here were more related to the introduction and maintenance
of a military atmosphere within the acquisition community as
opposed to specific user or operational experience that is
traceable to branch affiliation. Additionally, it must be pointed
out that as the statement is worded it can be taken to include not
only FA 97s, but all officers serving in the Acquisition Corps.
3. Open-ended Question Results. The summarized responses
from each of the open-ended questions in the survey are presented
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below. The first three questions asked respondents to check a
"YES" or "NO" block and then provide written comments if so
desired. The last two questions simply asked respondents to
provide written answers.
The analysis for each of the first three questions presents
the summarized numbers of yes and no "checks" along with the
numbers of comments made that correspond to each followed by a
narrative analysis of the respondents' comments with the emphasis
being to identify any consensus among the comments. It should be
noted here that in the numbers shown for the summarized responses
they do not add up to the 130 total of the sample due to the fact
that many respondents who answered "no" to question 3a felt it
unnecessary to answer the subsequent two questions. The analysis
for the last two questions (numbers four and five) , consists of a
summary of the types of responses given along with a discussion of
the salient comments made. All of the written comments are
reproduced in their entirety in Appendix D.
a. Question 3a. Should there be a heavier reliance on
branch coding for all FA 97 positions? In other words should more
FA 97 billets be coded for a specific branch or branch type (e.g.
Combat Arms or Combat Support)?
YES: 50 NO: 80
YES COMMENTS: 8 NO COMMENTS: 22
1) Narrative analysis. Of the twenty-two "No"
comments the predominant reasons given were that other branches
were "just as capable" as Combat Arms; that a basic understanding
of how the Army in general operates in the field is more important
than branch specificity; that the job just doesn't require it (user
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experience); and one officer stated that a contracting officer may
lose his objectivity if he is too closely associated with an item
because of branch background. The consensus among the "Yes"
comments was that a heavier reliance on branch coding should depend
on each specific position based on the level of product/item
expertise needed; and that user experience enhances the contracting
officer's credibility with the customer (i.e. the PM shop). One
particular comment to note came from an officer that did not mark
either yes or no and stated that "It doesn't matter-I tried to do
this as a young Captain in 1979" and that PERSCOM's policy was to
assign officers based only on the first two digits of a billet code
(e.g. 97A18), and that the "trailer specialty code" was essentially
irrelevant.
b. Question 3b. If you feel there should be a heavier
reliance on branch coding should this reliance vary by grade? In
other words should entry level positions (0-3 or 0-4) be branch
immaterial while critical positions (0-5 or 0-6) be branch coded?
YES: 27 NO: 85
YES COMMENTS: 10 NO COMMENTS: 23
1) Narrative analysis. The overwhelming theme in
all of the written responses to this question (21 of 33 comments)
revolved around the belief that this question should be just the
opposite. In other words respondents felt that it is more
important for entry level positions to be branch coded than it is
for senior officers. The major reason given was that senior
officers must be more broad-based in their approach to their duties
while junior officers will be more heavily involved in the
"details" of the procurement process and are still intimately
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familiar with the current branch related environment from which
they just came. Several respondents again iterated that branch
coding decisions should be made based on the specific needs of the
MACOM and the MACOM should make those decisions.
c. Question 3c. If you feel there should be a heavier
reliance on branch coding should this reliance vary by MACOM or
duty position? In other words should DLA (DCMAO or DPRO) positions
be branch immaterial while AMC (buying command) billets be branch
coded?
YES: 41 NO: 70
YES COMMENTS: 5 NO COMMENTS: 17
1) Narrative analysis. Once again a recurring theme
(9 respondents) is that any decision regarding branch coding a
billet must be made by each individual organization and that both
DLA and AMC billets may require branch-specific experience but that
that was a decision that only the organization could make.
Examples of comments included: "The specific organization is better
able to determine the coding..." needs, or "...decision should be
based on duties, not MACOM...", and "each job will need to be
evaluated on its own merits and requirements .
"
d. Question 4. Have you ever encountered a situation
where a lack of user experience on the part of the contracting
officer had a detrimental effect on a procurement action? Please
explain below.
In response to this question twenty-seven officers provided
specific examples of situations where they felt a lack of user
experience adversely affected a procurement action. The majority
of these respondents felt that a PCO with specific user experience
would have prevented this adversity. Fourteen respondents'
comments generally took the form of "no, but it helps..." in that
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they had never encountered any situation like this but felt that
user experience would always be helpful in all circumstances.
Twelve did not provide specific examples but expressed concern over
a demonstrated lack of urgency or empathy on the part of civilian
contracting officers/specialists and attributed this to a lack of
military/field experience. Roughly half a dozen officers stated
that there should never be a problem of the type specified in the
question because there is adequate availability of knowledgeable
technical/engineering staff in the PM shop/matrix organization to
resolve any issues that surface with regards to detailed equipment
questions. Finally, it must be pointed out that almost half of the
respondents put nothing down which can be taken to imply that they
have never seen any situations where a lack of user experience on
the part of a contracting officer became a negative factor in the
action. The bottom line here is that, other than what appears to
be isolated incidents (based on the relatively few provided) , the
impression we can come away with is that the lack of user
experience on the part of contracting officers has not had a
detrimental impact on procurement actions in the past.
e. Question 5. Which, if any, of the various Army buying
commands would benefit by having uniformed contracting officers
that have prior user, or operational, experience in terms of the
predominant types of items, equipment, or commodities that the
command is responsible for procuring?
The summarized responses to this question are presented in
Figure 21 on the following page. Roughly 43% of respondents said
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ALL NONE ATOOM Ml CO/I
UNKNOWN AMCCOM CECOM
BUYING COMMAND
FIGURE 21: RESPONSES TO QUESTION 5.
all buying commands would benefit, almost 22% (21.5) said they
couldn't answer or didn't know, and 10% said none would benefit.
In addition many respondents identified specific commands that they
felt would benefit by having contracting officers with user
experience. In short we can conclude that the majority of
respondents felt that all, or at least some, of the AMC buying
commands would be better served with the assignment of contracting
officers possessive of prior operational experience with the types
of items the command procures.
C. PERSONAL INTERVIEWS.
1. General. Representatives from each of the following
agencies were questioned by the author: the office of the Army
Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel (DCSPER); the FA 97 assignments
office at the Array Personnel Command (PERSCOM); the FA 97
Proponency office of the Army Contracting Support Agency (CSA); and
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the Personnel office at Headquarters, Army Materiel Command (AMC)
.
The interviews were conducted during a visit to the HQDA area by
the author concurrent with the conduct of the survey. The purpose
was to determine what procedures had been employed in building the
initial MAPL and to identify what steps would have to be taken,
mechanistically, if a policy of increased reliance on branch coding
were to be implemented. The results of each interview are
summarized below.
a) DCSPER. This interview took place with MAJ Brown who
was the Acquisition Corps liaison to the DCSPER' s office. The
Major had also previously served as the branch chief of the MAMB.
He identified three divergent factors, in terms of branch coding FA
97 billets, that came into play in the early stages of the Army
Acquisition Corps. The first was the desires of the MACOM. In
other words the overriding factor in creating the original MAPL was
the requests of the individual MACOMs. The second was the ability
of the basic branches to "give up" bodies to the AAC. There was
essentially a "negotiation process" that took place between the
MAMB and the individual branches with regards to the extent to
which the branches could "lose" officers to the AAC. Branches that
were already critically short on officers (e.g. Military
Intelligence, Finance) were required to provide less officers to
the AAC relative to overstrength branches (e.g. Infantry, or any
other Combat Arm). The final element which was, as MAJ Brown
described it, less overt than the other two, was the ability of the
FA 97 to establish credibility with the customer, or user
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community. He stated that an officer with branch specific
experience would have more immediate credibility than an officer
without branch specific experience in dealing with PM shops,
contractors, or Combat Development Center (CDC) personnel in the
branch "schoolhouses" (e.g. the Armor CDC at Fort Knox, KY, or the
Infantry CDC at Fort Benning, GA) . [2]
b) PERSCOM. Two officers were interviewed in this case;
CPT Carroll, the Captains assignments officer in the FA 97 branch
of the Military Acquisition Management Branch (MAMB) , and MAJ
Carson who was preparing to take over CPT Carroll's job as the
assignments officer. Their job was to manage the actual assignment
process of all FA 97 Captains entering the Acquisition Corps Army-
wide. The gist of their comments was that CPT Carroll was opposed
to an increased reliance on branch coding for two main reasons.
First, in his estimation, it was just not necessary because the
functional tasks associated with an FA 97 were generic enough to
preclude branch affiliated expertise. Second, officers were not
assessed into the AAC based on branch-coded billets. He said that
the MAPL had not been built using branch coded positions and
consequently officers were not brought into the AAC specifically to
fill branch coded slots. The result, if an attempt was made to
emphasize branch coding, in CPT Carroll's opinion, would be a lack
of continuity between the accession process and the assignment
process and a very unmanageable personnel management system. Both
said that for a system involving a heavier reliance on branch
coding to be made to work, the accession process would have to be
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"needs-based" in that officers would have to be assessed
specifically based on the branch coding of the MAPL. For example,
if there were ten Signal Corps billets on the MAPL then, during the
accession process, ten Signal Corps officers would have to be
brought in to fill those slots. The problem associated with
managing a system like this would be that officers have to be
"grown" to fill senior level billets and, under a branch coded
system, it is very difficult to forecast the "growth" rate of
officers within specific "branch tracks". For example, under the
current system the FA 97 population is required to "grow" roughly
60 Colonels regardless of branch. Under a branch coded system
PERSCOM might have to grow the same 60 Colonels except that there
would need to be a certain number in each branch.
Captain Carroll stated that assigning an officer for his/her
initial AAC tour in a position related to their branch makes for a
smoother, and easier transition from the "operational Army" to the
Acquisition Corps. Finally both MAJ Carson and CPT Carroll both
said that the current PERSCOM policy is to assign officers to
billets based on the first two digits of the position code. For
example a typical billet code will look like "97A00" or "97A11"
where the 97A identifies a FA 97 officer and the 00 or 11 indicates
a branch immaterial and Infantry officer respectively. According
to both officers when they receive a request for an officer they
will attempt to make the assignment to meet the "trailer specialty"
(i.e. the second two digits) but that the bottom line is they are
only required to make the assignment based on the first two digits.
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[4] [5]
c) CSA. The representative from the Army Contracting
Support Agency was LTC Adams, the Chief of the FA 97 Proponency
Office. The Proponency Office is responsible for the development
of policies pertaining to the utilization of FA 97 officers. LTC
Adams stated that the purpose of FA 97s is to provide Army
experience and a sense of urgency to the Acquisition Corps vice any
specific operational experience, although he agreed that having a
contracting officer that does have branch affiliation with the
equipment being procured is certainly helpful but not a
prerequisite. He had specific concerns with a heavier reliance on
branch coding because he fears that if we "sub-optimize" the AAC we
run the risk of over specializing and reducing our general
flexibility within the AAC. Additionally he stated that by the
time an officer in the AAC gets to the 0-5/0-6 level his/her
specific operational knowledge is outdated and non-current thus
mitigating any potential benefit that could have been provided by
the officer. [1]
d) AMC The acting chief of the Army Acquisition Corps
Management Office, HQ AMC, Mr. Bartholo, was interviewed in order
to determine what role AMC had played in the buying commands'
requests for positions during the development of the initial MAPL.
Specifically he was asked what guidance had been issued by AMC to
the MACOMs in terms of branch coding the uniformed FA 97 positions.
He said that there had been no guidance issued regarding any
instructions in terms of branch coding but that the MACOMs had
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essentially been told they had a free hand in terms of what they
could request. In other words, according to Mr. Bartholo, the
MACOMs could have asked for anything they wanted to include an
increased (or decreased) number of uniformed FA 97 billets that
were coded for a specific branch or branch type. [2]
D. SUMMARY.
In this chapter the survey data were presented along with an
analysis of the data. The summarized results of each of the survey
questions were provided along with a narrative interpretation of
what the results mean in terms of favoring or disfavoring a
preference for user experience. Finally, the summaries of the
personal interviews were presented. The question now becomes one
of identifying the implications of these results vis-a-vis the
current MAPL and the existing FA 97 assignments process.
Based on the survey results it is clear that user/operational
experience enhances the effectiveness of a cognizant contracting
officer (survey statement 2b); that there is a strong desire within
the acquisition community for contracting officers to possess user
experience or for them to gain this sort of familiarity after being
assigned to a buying command (statements 2e and 2g respectively);
and that user experience facilitates the processing of requirements
documentation by better enabling contracting officers to review the
documents and incorporate the requirements accurately into a
solicitation, bid package, or the actual contract itself.
Additionally, question 5 indicates that most of the community
believes that all of the AMC MACOMs would benefit by having
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assigned contracting officers with user experience.
There are still several issues that must be addressed in
further detail. While the data clearly show there is an
overwhelming belief that user experience in general enhances the
effectiveness of a contracting officer (statement 2b) , the data
just as clearly show that, pragmatically, there are some
significant concerns as to how user experience could, or should, be
utilized in terms of the branch coding of FA 97 billets (question
3a) . Another issue is the need to expand on the results from
statement 2h in which an attempt was made to determine if a
relationship exists between the CMFs and the AMC commodity
organizations. A third issue remaining to be discussed is the
resolution of the general versus specific military experience
identified in statement 2i. The final issue stems from the current
PERSCOM assignment policy as identified during the second set of





This chapter resolves the anomalies, or unresolved issues,
alluded to in the previous chapter. Specifically it focuses on
four issues that the author feels must be addressed before closing
the thesis. The first is the apparent dichotomy created between
statement 2b in which respondents strongly state that User
experience enhances the effectiveness of a contracting officer; and
question 3a in which the majority of respondents state that there
should not be an increased reliance on branch coding. In short, we
seem to have answers that directly contradict each other. The
second is the relatively weak findings on statement 2h regarding
the relationship between CMF types and the equipment types bought
by each of the AMC buying commands. The third issue revolves
around the question of "general" versus "specific" operational
experience identified in statement 2i on the survey. Finally, the
fourth issue concerns the current PERSCOM policy regarding the
officer assignment procedure. Each of these issues is discussed in
detail.
B. CONTRACTING OFFICER EFFECTIVENESS VERSUS AN INCREASED RELIANCE
ON BRANCH CODING.
On the one hand, there is almost universal agreement that user
experience enhances a contracting officer's effectiveness
(statement 2b). On the other hand, there is a strong consensus of
opinion that there should not be an increased reliance on branch
coding (question 3a). How do we interpret these seemingly
contradictory positions? A review of the statistical analysis on
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statement 2b, along with a review of the modifying comments, shows
that the findings with respect to this statement alone are
inarguable. Why, then, wouldn't anyone want to branch code billets
to ensure assignment of officers that already possess operational
user experience if it is already a foregone conclusion that it
would enhance the effectiveness of the officer? By turning to the
written responses to question 3a we can find several possible
explanations for this phenomenon.
The most common reason given for a negative response was that
user experience just isn't necessary; that "you don't need
operational experience"; and that an officer from a non-related
branch is just as capable. The author's counter to this is that
the question here isn't one of need, it is a question of want.
There is, fundamentally, a big difference between the two. It
appears that those respondents answering "no" to question 3a
interpreted the question as "do we have to have ..." or "does there
need to be..." an increased reliance, when in fact the question
says "should." This interpretation would tend to mitigate, or
alleviate, the contradictory appearance between the two items and
inclines one towards acceptance of the results of item 2b.
A second possible cause of the negative responses to 3a
surfaces in several comments (which, in actuality represent a
recurring theme throughout the survey) . They concerned the belief
that each organization must decide whether or not a position should
be branch coded, as opposed to a HQDA level coding of billets. In
other words, a number of respondents felt that the decision to
72
specify, or not specify, a branch requirement will vary from
position to position and that each MACOM is best able to make that
decision.
Another possible source of the negative "flavor" to 3a may
that, on the one hand, respondents believe that user experience
enhances the effectiveness of a contracting officer, on the other
hand they are unsure whether the benefit to be gained by increased
reliance exceeds the cost. In several cases (in both interviews
and surveys) , respondents identified potential downfalls of a
branch-coding philosophy. The most notable of thes included a loss
of assignments flexibility, or "stove-piping" within the FA 97
community wherein officers wind up "sub-tracking" a career path
within a career path; and the difficulties associated with managing
the connection between entry level assession into the AAC, and
assignments at the senior 0-5/0-6 level several years later.
In short, the author concludes that, based on the discussion
above and especially on the overwhelming strength of the 2b
responses, respondents believe that an increased reliance on branch
coding should be beneficial but that a determination as to the cost
of increased reliance must first be made.
C. GENERAL MILITARY VERSUS SPECIFIC OPERATIONAL EXPERIENCE.
The issue that needs to be resolved here stems from the fact
that a large number of participants modified their responses to
statement 2i by saying that the purpose of a uniformed presence in
the Acquisition Corps is to provide "general military experience,"
not necessarily specific, branch-related, operational experience.
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This is also a theme that surfaced several times throughout the
survey
.
In terras of arguing for an increased reliance on branch coding
this is a relatively simple issue to resolve. In the author's
opinion, branch coding a billet simply takes the notion of
experience one step further. If we view experience as a spectrum,
then, at one end, we have a civilian contracting officer with no
military experience. Moving "up" the scale one step, we would have
a uniformed contracting officer with "general" military experience
but not specific branch related experience. And finally, at the
far end of the spectrum, we would find a branch related officer who
possesses both general and specific military, operational
experience. While this is somewhat of an oversimplification, the
point is that this interpretation can be taken to resolve this
issue by concluding that the results should be viewed as favoring
an increased reliance on branch coding because a branch coded
officer would bring both general military and specific operational
experience to bear on the acquisition process.
D. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CAREER MANAGEMENT FIELDS (CMFs) AND
THE AMC COMMODITY ORGANIZATION.
The dilemma created here was due to the fact that a large
number of respondents felt that the survey statement (2h), as it
was presented in the survey, was too much of a generalization.
These officers stated that each of the buying commands' products
were, by and large, ultimately used by all soldiers in the field
regardless of CMF.
The author's counter to these statements (as previously
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alluded to in Chapter IV) , relies on the notion of "primacy of
knowledge," and detailed expertise. Just because a soldier can get
into a truck and drive it doesn't mean, by any stretch of the
imagination, that we would expect that same soldier to be able to
render a detailed discussion on how the various engine components
interact with each other to make the vehicle move. We would,
however, expect a maintenance soldier/officer to be able to do so.
As another example, would anyone expect the Infantry officer
broadcasting a situation report over his radio to be able to
explain in-depth how the internal components of the radio interact,
or what radio frequency propagation is/does, or how the
transmission "loads" on the antenna? Of course not!
The bottom line here is that we were able to identify the
existence of a relationship between CMFs and commodity groupings
through the survey (albeit moderate). By coupling this fact with
the idea of "primacy of knowledge," we can resolve this anomaly and
it becomes readily apparent that we can associate commodity groups
with specific branches, or branch types.
E. PERSCOM OFFICER ASSIGNMENT POLICY.
During the interview with the FA 97 assignments officers at
PERSCOM, both stated that the current PERSCOM policy is to make
assignments based on the first two digits of a position code. For
example, a typical contracting officer position code will look like
97A00 which means an FA 97 officer that is branch immaterial. A
branch coded slot will have a position code such as 97A18 which
would mean an FA 97 that is also a Special Forces branch officer.
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Both assignments officers said that they do, in practice, try to
assign FA 97 officers bearing in mind branch specificity. In other
words they will try to assign an Infantry officer (CMF 11), to a
billet coded 97A11, but that their first priority is to fulfill the
Functional Area requirement. In the author's opinion this is
commendable but is also too dependent on the personal discretion of
the particular assignments officer. In other words the relative
amount of importance given to branch considerations will vary from
assignments officer to assignments officer. For example, during
the conduct of the interview, Captain Carroll stated that on
several occasions he had received Personnel Requisitions from the
MACOMs that identified a specific branch in the request and that he
had ignored the specification because, in his opinion, it wasn't a
valid requirement.
E. SUMMARY.
The purpose of this chapter was to resolve four issues that
had been left insufficiently answered in the data analysis
presented in Chapter IV. We have resolved all four and find that
respondents do indicate that an increased reliance should be
beneficial but that the issue needs further exploration so as to
identify the costs associated with increasing the level of
reliance; that the use of branch coding would simultaneously
satisfy both a "specific" and a "general" military experience
requirement; that, through the notion of primacy of knowledge,
there does exist a relationship between an officers branch and the
commodity organization of the AMC MACOMs; and that the current
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PERSCOM assignment policy of assigning based only on the first two
digits of a billet code is limited by the fact that it is subject
to the personal discretion of the individual assignments officer,
and varies depending on how often the assignments officer is
rotated.
In closing it must be noted that all of the research to this
point has revolved essentially around a question of "should we"
increase our reliance on branch coding. The short answer, from the
perspective of the respondents, is yes, we should. We will now
turn to the issue of "how " in the next chapter as we conclude the
thesis by identifying specific actions that should be taken in
light of the findings here.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. GENERAL.
This chapter presents the conclusions that can be made based
on the discussion and analysis of the research findings in the
preceding chapters. It also provides some recommendations in terms
of actions to be taken. Finally, the chapter presents several
areas for further research.
B. CONCLUSIONS.
There are four key conclusions based on the research findings.
1. Increased reliance on branch coding. Respondents believe
that an increase in the amount of emphasis placed on branch coding
FA 97 billets beyond the current level present in the Acquisition
Corps should be beneficial to the Corps. This conclusion is
derived from the specific findings that show: user experience
enhances the effectiveness of a cognizant contracting officer;
there is a desire for contracting officer user experience within
the Acquisition Corps community; and that the presence of branch-
specific contracting officers allows for the introduction of both
general as well as specific military experience into the
acquisition community.
2. Branch-coding decisions. Respondents believe that the
best place to make branch-coding decisions, in terms of both the
specific branch as well as which billets to code or not to code, is
at the organizational level (i.e. MACOM or buying command level).
This is as opposed to decisions being made at the Headquarters,
Department of the Army level (i.e. PERSCOM)
.
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3. CMF-AMC MACOM relationship. The research shows that a
relationship exists between the commodity groups around which the
Army Materiel Command's MACOMs are organized, and the Career
Management Fields (CMFs) of the soldiers that ultimately put the
equipment to operational use. This conclusion is caveated with the
notion of "primacy of knowledge." In other words, in terms of
identifying where CMF-commodity relationships do, or do not, exist,
the fundamental question that must be asked is: Where are the
"subject matter experts" on the equipment?
4. Branch specific assignments prohibitions. The research
shows that, although currently there is a relative lack of emphasis
on branch coding FA 97 billets, there is nothing in terms of either
philosophy or policy that prevents the assignment of an FA 97
officer with user experience to a billet. In many cases, in fact,
PERSCOM has made FA 97 assignments where the assigned officer had
specific operational experience with the commodity type of the
command to which he/she was assigned.
C . RECOMMENDATIONS .
There are three major recommendations provided here and all
three are shown in the paragraphs that follow.
1. User experience policy letter. The FA 97 proponency
office should initiate a study to identify and compare/contrast the
potential costs and benefits associated with an increased reliance
on branch coding. This study, which could and should be
accomplished in large part through the sponsorship of thesis
preparation by Army FA 97 graduate students, should involve a
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MACOM-by-MACOM review of all FA 97 contracting officer positions so
as to identify the specific functional duties performed by each.
A decision should then be made with regards to the usefulness of
branch specifying each billet. This process must focus on whether
or not a branch specific officer would be the most effective in
filling the position.
The end result of this study (or studies as the case may be)
,
should be the preparation and publication of an FA 97 user
experience policy that identifies considerations to be applied in
deciding whether billets should, or should not, be branch coded.
These considerations might include items such as: the amount of
interface an FA 97 has with user (i.e. PM) organizations; the
availability of branch-specific officers in the Acquisition Corps
population that can be used to fill branch coded billets; or the
use of "branch types" (e.g. combat arms, combat support, or combat
service support) in coding billets.
2. PERSCOM assignment policy change. The interviews
indicated that the current PERSCOM-wide assignment policy is one
whereby officers are assigned to billets based solely on the
Functional Area requirement. The FA 97 personnel managers should
undertake to develop an assignment policy wherein the first
priority is given to an officer that simultaneously fulfills the
requirement of both the Functional Area and the branch. This is,
admittedly, a subtle change but a necessary one all the same. The
acquisition community is one area of the Army where uniformed
officers will rely on integrating their previous experience into
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the performance of their acquisition peculiar tasks. While the
current assignments officers state that they do attempt to bear
branch specificity in mind when making assignments, this is too
subject to variation based on the personal judgment of whoever the
particular assignments officer happens to be at the time an
assignment is made. The policy should be "codified" to the maximum
extent possible in a written policy so as to reduce the impact of
variation due to personnel turnover in the FA 97 assignments
office.
3. FA 97 billet review. The personnel managers at the Army
Materiel Command should initiate a detailed review of each FA 97
contracting officer position (either unilaterally, or in
conjunction with an FA 97 proponency office study) , within AMC so
as to identify the specific functional duties performed by each and
then render a decision with regards to the usefulness of branch
specificity. This process, however, must stress that the focus
should be on whether a branch specific officer would be more
effective than a non-branch specific officer in performing the job.
Consideration should be given to the relationship between the
manner in which AMC MACOMs are organized along specific commodity
lines, and the CMFs of the soldiers that ultimately put the
commodity items to use in the field. Also, AMC could give
additional consideration to relating FA 97 billets to FA 51 coded
billets. For example, if CECOM has 65% of its FA 51 billets coded
for Signal Corps officers perhaps there should be a similar
percentage of FA 97 billets.
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D. ANSWERS TO RESEARCH QUESTIONS.
1. Primary. Should operational, or user, experience be a
factor in the assignment of contracting officers to commands
responsible for procuring supplies and services?
User experience should be a critical factor in the
assignment of contracting officers within the AMC buying commands,






a) What commands are responsible for procuring supplies
and services?
The Army Materiel Command's Major Subordinate
Commands (MACOMs) are the primary organizations within the Army
Acquisition Corps that have responsibility for the procurement of
all the supplies and services needed by the Army at large.
b) What is the legislative, regulatory, and command
guidance concerning the preference for user experience and
knowledge on the part of the cognizant contracting officer?
The extent of the guidance that has been issued with
regards to user experience is limited only to the idea that the
purpose of a uniformed presence in the Acquisition Corps is to
provide operational experience. There is a dearth of guidance with
regards to specific user experience.
c) What was the rationale behind the development of the
basic branch coding in the current fielding plan of the uniformed
contracting officers in the Army Acquisition Corps?
The primary considerations applied in developing the
current fielding plan involved Functional Area alignment (i.e. an
FA 97 in a contracting job or an FA 51 in a PM shop job)
;
reconciliation of the total number of officers requested by the
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MACOMs with the total number of officers available in the
population; and validation of each position as first, an honest
need for a billet and second, an evaluation of whether the position
required a military officer (vice a civilian) to fill it.
d) To what extent, and under what conditions, would a
lack of user experience on the part of the Procuring Contracting
Officer reduce the effectiveness of an acquisition action?
The answer here is that the research shows a lack of
user experience on the part of the PCO does not have a detrimental
effect on a procurement action. The research also shows, however,
that the introduction of user experience can have a positive
impact
.
e) Should specific user experience be required for
officers being assigned to duties as contracting officers in
commands that buy supplies and services?
The research shows that specific user experience
should undoubtedly play a critical role if we want to enhance the
effectiveness of contracting officers.
E. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH.
In order to further define and clarify the findings presented
here the following areas for further research are provided.
1. Implementation costs. Research should be conducted in
order to identify the potential costs of implementing the
recommendations shown above. In this case the likely costs may
include some level of reduced flexibility in terms of the
assignments process and potential career development of FA 97
officers, as well as any requisite changes or modifications to the
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method used in assessing officers into the Army Acquisition Corps.
In other words, will there be officers whose career paths will be
inhibited by the application of branch coding; and how would the
assession process have to change in order to bring officers in to
the AAC and meet the branch specific requirements?
2. Specific functional tasks versus branch related knowledge.
A detailed review (perhaps of selected positions within a MACOM or
MACOMs) should be conducted with an eye towards identifying all of
the specific functional tasks required to be performed by the
position. This list of tasks could then be evaluated in terms of
how much "branch-specific" knowledge or experience would impact on
the ability of the officer to perform the tasks. For example, if
a position in TACOM routinely involved the detailed review of
Statements of Work that included technical descriptions of Armor
related systems, how much would the officer reviewing the SOWs be
able to draw on previous experience as an Armor officer in Armor
assignments in performing the review.
3. Personal satisfaction. A survey of officers newly
assessed into the AAC could be performed in order to gauge their
level of personal job satisfaction and whether or not they would
receive more satisfaction serving in an entry level AAC assignment
that was directly related to their previous branch assignments.
F. CLOSING COMMENTS.
The bottom line of this research reveals that an increased
reliance on branch coding Functional Area 97 contracting officer
billets in the Army Acquisition Corps is preferred. A detailed
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discussion of how the AAC should implement this reliance is beyond
the scope of this research. What this thesis does reveal, however,
is that rather than asking the question "Could a non-branch
specific officer do the job?" the question to ask is "whether a
branch specific officer could do it Jbetter?"
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APPENDIX A. ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
1. AAC: Army Acquisition Corps.
2. AMC: Army Materiel Command.
3. AMCCOM: Army Armaments, Munitions, and Chemical Command. An
AMC MACOM, or buying command.
4
.
ARL : Army Research Laboratory . An AMC MACOM
.
5. ASA-RDA: The Assistant Secretary of the Army for Research,
Development and Acquisition. Commonly abbreviated as SARDA.
Also referred to as the Army Acquisition Executive.
6. ATCOM: Army Aviation and Troop Command. An AMC MACOM, or
buying command.
7. BDU: Battle Dress Uniform. The camouflage duty uniform worn by
most soldiers in the U.S. Army.
8. Branch: A grouping of officers which comprises an arm or
service of the Army.
9. CDC: Combat Development Center. The organization responsible
for interface between the acquisition community and the user
community. Each of the branch centers (e.g. Infantry, Armor,
etc) has an organic CDC.
10. CECOM: Communications-Electronics Command. An AMC MACOM, or
buying command.
11. CMF: Career Management Field. A grouping of duty positions made
up of skills and requirements which are mutually supporting
and culminate in the development of officers skills necessary
to perform at the LTC or COL level.
12. CSA: Chief of Staff of the Army. A four-star position; the
senior uniformed representative of the Army and a member of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
13. Cognizant Contracting Officer. The contracting officer
directly involved in, responsible for, and knowledgable about
a procurement action.
14. COL. Colonel. An officer in the grade of 0-6.
15. DACM. Director of Acquisition Career Management. An officer,
or SES position, directly reporting to the SARDA that is
responsible for the development of policy and oversight in
terms of any decisions/actions effecting the career paths of
Acquisition Corps members.
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16. DAWIA. Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act. Chapter
87, Title XII, Public Law 101-510.
17. DCMAO. Defense Contract Management Area Operations.
18. DCMD. Defense Contract Management District.
19. DCSPER. The Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel.
20. DESCOM. Depot Systems Command. An AMC MACOM.
21. DFARS. The Department of Defense Supplement to the Federal
Acquisition Regulation.
22. DLA. Defense Logistics Agency.
23. DPRO. Defense Plant Representative Office.
24. FA. Functional Area. A grouping of officers by career field
other that arm, service, or branch that possess an
interrelated grouping of tasks or skills which usually
requires significant education, training, or experience.
25. FAR. Federal Acquisition Regulation.
26. HQDA. Headquarters, Department of the Army.
27. KO. Contracting officer. The Army generally refers to
contracting officers as KOs as opposed to COs to avoid
confusion with a Commanding Officer which is generally
abbreviated CO.
28. LTC. Lieutenant Colonel. An officer in the grade of 0-5.
29. MACOM. Major subordinate command.
30. MAMB. The Military Acquisition Management Branch. The branch
of the Army Acquisition Corps Management Office responsible
for management of uniformed members of the AAC.
31. MAPL. The Military Acquisition Position List. A document that
identifies every billet for the uniformed members of the Army
Acquisition Corps.
32. MICOM. Missile Command. An AMC MACOM, or buying command.
33. PCO. The Principal Contracting Officer. The contracting
officer directly assigned responsibility for the completion
of a contractual action.
34. PEO. Program Executive Officer.
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35. PERSCOM. U.S. Army Personnel Command. The agency , at HQDA
level, responsible for the consolidated, centralized
management of all personnel in the United States Army.
36. PM. Program Manager.
37. SOW. Statement of Work. The document which identifies the
necessary work to be performed as part of a procurement
action.
38. TACOM. Tank Automotive Command. An AMC MACOM, or buying
command
.
39. TECOM. Test and Evaluation Command. An AMC MACOM.
40. USDA. Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition.
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APPENDIX B. SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
U.S. Army Student Detachment
U.S. Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93943-5000
Date-
Rank- First name- Last name-
Address-
City-, State- Zip code-
Dear Rank- Last name-
,
Reference our phone conversation on Date- and the enclosed
survey questionnaire. As I said when we spoke, I am an SF officer
attending graduate school prior to entering the Acquisition Corps.
As part of my graduate work I am doing my thesis on the extent to
which user experience should be a factor in assigning Functional
Area 97 officers to positions in the Army buying commands.
For the purposes of the thesis I am defining user experience
as the branch peculiar knowledge, skill, or judgment gained through
the practice or conduct of military operations. A portion of my
research involves surveying senior Acquisition Corps officers in
order to ascertain the level of preference for FA 97 user
experience. I ask that you please take the time to complete the
questionnaire and return it to me in the envelope provided.
Your assistance is greatly appreciated. Please add any
comments or suggestions that you think would be pertinent to the
subject.
Should you wish to talk directly to me, I can be reached at
the address shown below, or telephonically at 408-649-0651.
CPT Damon T. Walsh




ENCL: Damon T. Walsh
Survey Questionnaire Captain, Special Forces




a . Rank b. Primary Branch. c. Functional Area
d. MACOM e. Title/Duty Position.
f. How long in current position.
g. Is your current position a "Critical Position" UP
of DODI 5000. 52M and the Defense Acquisition Work-
force Improvement Act (DAWIA)
:
YES_ NO
h. Total number of years in acquisition/procurement
related assignments:
i. Of your total number of years in the acquisition community pleas<
indicate below where your time has been spent by indicating the
number of years in each of the categories:
DLA (or DOD/Joint) AMC Base, camp, station
Pre-Award (PCO) Post-Award ( ACO/Terminations
)
2. Please rate the following statements on a scale of 1 to 5 with 1 be:
"strongly disagree" and 5 being "strongly agree." For the purposes of tl
survey "user experience" means operational experience with the type
equipment or items being purchased. For example, user experience for 1
purchase of a new helicopter, or helicopter related items, would mean an A]
aviator. Please circle the appropriate number on the bar below the questi<
If you feel it is necessary to modify your rating with written commeni
check the "REMARKS MADE" block and place your comments in the remarks sect:
at the end of this section. Please preface each of your written comme;
with the question number (e.g. "2a:").
a. User experience is required on the part of a cognizant contract
officer in order for him/her to effectively perform his/her duties.







b. User experience would enhance the effectiveness of a cogniz
contracting officer although it is not absolutely reguired.









c. A contracting officer from another service (i.e. a Navy, Air Force,
• Marine Corps contracting officer) would be just as effective serving in an




STRONGLY DISAGREE NEITHER AGREE AGREE STRONGLY
DISAGREE NOR DISAGREE AGREE
d. When a contracting officer has user experience with a proposed item
: facilitates the preparation of reguirements documents (i.e. Statements of
>rk/Bid packages )
.
2d: REMARKS MADE12 3 4 5
STRONGLY DISAGREE NEITHER AGREE AGREE STRONGLY
DISAGREE NOR DISAGREE AGREE
e. It is safe to say that in the acquisition community there is a desire
>r contracting officer user experience, but not necessarily a need for this
pe of operational experience.
2e: REMARKS MADE12 3 4 5
<= >
STRONGLY DISAGREE NEITHER AGREE AGREE STRONGLY
DISAGREE NOR DISAGREE AGREE
f. By the time a procurement action reaches the PCO level, the
quirements definition is specific enough to preclude a requirement for the
ntracting officer's user familiarity with the item.
2f : REMARKS MADE12 3 4 5
<= >
STRONGLY DISAGREE NEITHER AGREE AGREE STRONGLY
DISAGREE NOR DISAGREE AGREE
g. It has always been helpful for newly assigned FA 97 officers to
imiliarize themselves with the items being procured by their new command.
2g: REMARKS MADE12 3 4 5
STRONGLY DISAGREE NEITHER AGREE AGREE STRONGLY
DISAGREE NOR DISAGREE
Pg 2 of 5
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h. The items procured by each of the "buying commands" in AMC <
generally of such a nature that the operational users of the equipment
items will fall within specific Career Management Fields (e.g. iti
purchased by TACOM will usually ultimately be put to use in the field











i. One of the purposes of having a uniformed presence in the Acquisit
Corps is to bring operational expertise to the acquisition community.







SECTION 2 REMARKS: Please provide any written comments that modify the ra
statements shown above.
Pg 3 of 5
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The current Military Acquisition Position List (MAPL) indicates that 84%
c all FA 97 positions are branch immaterial in terms of the basic branch of
le officer required for the position. Removing the DLA positions from the
^PL reduces the branch immaterial percentage to 81%. The following
lestions relate to these statistics.
a. Should there be a heavier reliance on branch coding for all FA 97
>sitions. In other words should more FA 97 billets be coded for a specific
ranch or branch type (e.g. Combat Arms or Combat Support)?
YES NO
-3a: REMARKS:
b. If you feel there should be a heavier reliance on branch coding
lould this reliance vary by grade? In other words should entry level
>sitions (0-3 or 0-4) be branch immaterial while critical positions (0-5 or
•6) be branch coded?
YES NO
-3b: REMARKS:
c. If you feel there should be a heavier reliance on branch coding
lould this reliance vary by MACOM or duty position? In other words should
jA (DCMAO or DPRO) positions be branch immaterial while AMC (buying command)
Lllets be branch coded?
YES NO
-3c: REMARKS:
Pg 4 of 5
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4 . Have you ever encountered a situation where a lack of user experience
the part of the contracting officer had a detrimental effect on a procurem
action? Please explain below.
5. Which, if any, of the various Army buying commands would benefit
having uniformed contracting officers that have prior user, or operation
experience in terms of the predominant types of items, equipment,
commodities that the command is responsible for procuring?
6. Please make any additional comments below (or on additional sheets
necessary) , that you feel are pertinent to the topic of the survey.
Pg 5 of 5
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APPENDIX C. SURVEY SECTION 2: MODIFYING STATEMENTS
1. Statement 2a Modifying Statements.
1) FA 51; Scored answer: AGREE. "This issue needs to be
looked at on a case-by-case (contract-by-contract) situation."
2) FA 97; Scored answer: DISAGREE. "The 'Green Suit'
experience definitely impacted successful completion (not so much
which branch)." "...the further a system moves through the
acquisition cycle the less branch specific qualifications impact on
it." "...early in development it is not a requirement to be branch
specific.
"
3) FA 51; Scored answer: AGREE. "Though not always required,
I firmly believe Acquisition Corps officers with an operational
background are needed .
"
4) FA 51; Scored answer: AGREE. "Yes—it helps. However the
user with operational experience is more beneficial in a 51 billet
in the requirements generation, or PMO, than they would be in a 97
billet as production, procurement, Quality Control officer."
5) FA 97; Scored answer: NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE. "Since
almost all KOs are civilian I can't argue for a 'requirement' for
user experience .
"
6) FA 51; Scored answer: DISAGREE. "Look at the Air Force.
They grow Acquisition officers without user experience."
7) FA 97; Scored answer: DISAGREE. "I feel user experience is
a must—but not by your definition. Any operational assignment is
sufficient to procure any commodity item."
8) FA 97; Scored answer: DISAGREE. "User experience may be
required in certain assignments, e.g., assignment to a PEO/PM
organization managing armored systems (M1A1, BFVS, etc.) of an
armor officer would enhance the effectiveness of the organization."
9) FA 97; Scored answer: AGREE. "Experience or knowledge of
the items being procured, especially complex procurements, is an
absolute must for the successful acquisition."
10) FA 97; Scored answer: NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE. "A
contracting officer must make the effort to understand what he is
buying and how it will be employed to satisfy requirements of the
ultimate user." "Successful procurements are not only exercises in
proper documentation and correct acquisition procedures, but also
did you get the best value item to satisfy the user's need."
11) FA 51; Scored answer: DISAGREE. "Contracting is a skill
that does not require 'user' type knowledge of the item being
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contracted for. A good KO (SC 97) can be branch immaterial."
12) FA 97; Scored answer: AGREE. "During Desert Storm
contracting officers with user experience made the difference since
the requirements people did not know or could not adequately write
up their requirement. I was the PARC/Commander of ARCENT
contracting command in Saudi .
"
13) FA 97; Scored answer: NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE. "Not
necessarily required but would certainly be beneficial."
14) FA 97; Scored answer: NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE. "Anyone
can perform contracting functions without user experience, however,
user experience certainly heightens your understanding of the
product being purchased and its importance."
15) FA 97; Scored answer: STRONGLY AGREE. "Mission equipment
i.e. -aviation buying helicopters."
16) FA 97; Scored answer: NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE. "Don't
agree that experience is needed in related items, just need
operational knowledge in general (desirable)."
17) FA 97: Scored answer: AGREE. "User experience really
depends on the program/item(s) being managed/procured. While not
in all cases is user experience necessary, it would be highly
desirable in some, and critical in others. A balance within an
organization would be best. That allows 'long-term' stability and
expertise within the Acquisition Center that a civilian has, with
'hands-on' knowledge and sense of urgency that a military member
gives to the organization."
18) FA 51: Scored answer: AGREE. "I believe your definition
of user experience is too narrow. User experience means more than
just 'operational experience' .. .with equipment. I do not believe
that a system can only be developed or procured by the branch (es)
which employs it. User experience to me means someone familiar
with the service, its needs, how it fights, and how the equipment
will be used."
19) FA 51; Scored answer: AGREE. "KO needs Army 'field'
experience-how we work and operate-does not necessarily need 'user'
experience in the area he is procuring in."
2. Statement 2b Modifying Statements.
1) FA 51; Scored answer: AGREE. "In most procurement areas."
2) FA 97; Scored answer: STRONGLY AGREE. "Aside from
performing as the technical expert to place a requirement on
contract, much of a KO's time is spent refining the SOW/CDRL/GFE so
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that he has an enforceable contract. User experience provides a
big payoff in performing these scrubs and establishing credibility
with both the Program Office and Contractor personnel."
3) FA 97; Scored answer: STRONGLY AGREE. "Operational
experience and expertise makes us better prepared to enhance a
buying commands performance, but I feel a dedicated aviation
officer can help buy tanks, trucks, ships, etc."
4) FA 51; Scored answer: AGREE. "...intimate user knowledge
is nice to have, but not important to fulfilling his role... one
exception: during termination/show cause/contract restructuring
exercises, it is at times very important that the KO understands
subtle nuances of technology and system performance to base his
actions upon."
5) FA 51; Scored answer: AGREE. "My experience with PCOs is
that they concentrate on acquisition regulations and laws more so
than performance, cost and schedule and therefore don't need or use
troop experience. PMs on the other hand do use troop experience in
managing cost, sch, perf. If your questions are geared toward a
PCO who functions as a PM as in a smaller community then he would
use and maybe require troop experience."
6) FA 97; Scored answer: STRONGLY AGREE. "Anyone can perform
contracting functions without user experience, however, user
experience certainly heightens your understanding of the product
being purchased and its importance."
7) FA 97: Scored answer: AGREE. "User experience really
depends on the program/item(s) being managed/procured. While not
in all cases is user experience necessary, it would be highly
desirable in some, and critical in others. A balance within an
organization would be best. That allows 'long-term' stability and
expertise within the Acquisition Center that a civilian has, with
'hands-on' knowledge and sense of urgency that a military member
gives to the organization."
8) FA 97; Scored answer: STRONGLY AGREE. "User experience in
the specified field is desired, i.e. aviators buying helicopters,
but if an aviator is not available, I feel at least a combat arms
officer is needed. He must be able to relate to the customer.
Combat support and combat service support officers seem to have a
much harder time gaining the trust of the 'customer' i.e. PM."
3. Statement 2c Modifying Statements.
1) FA 51; Scored answer: AGREE. "We've had Marine Corps
aviators work as Army PMs and procurement officers for common
requirements for USA and USMC .
"
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2) FA 97; Scored answer: AGREE. "Since almost all KOs are
civilians I can't argue for a 'requirement' for user experience."
3) FA 97; Scored answer: AGREE. "...the background of the
individual is not as important as the quality of the individual.
He should know what it feels like to be on the receiving end of the
acquisition system. Beyond that. . .the FAR is the FAR."
4) FA 97; Scored answer: DISAGREE. "Familiarity with service
supplements and specific procedures may impact PCO capability of
supporting 'their' service requirements—Experience in DLA/DCMC
indicates or supports this by such comments as 'that's not the way
we do it in the Air Force ,' or 'we don't have to do that in the
Navy."
5) FA 97; Scored answer: STRONGLY DISAGREE. "If contracting
were viewed as an isolated function then service distinction would
not be important. Contracting, however, also involves knowledge of
requirements, supportability, and doctrine of the supported
customer. For these reasons, service-peculiar assignments would be
more effective than cross-service assignments."
6) FA 97; Scored answer: AGREE. "Generally true: I served as
a contracting officer with only Navy and AF contracts."
7) FA 97; Scored answer: NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE. "As
joint training, doctrine, and assignments continue toward a
'people' force, distinctions should become less and less among
contracting officers from all services."
8) FA 51; Scored answer: STRONGLY DISAGREE. "A Marine Corps
Field Artillery officer could serve equally well as an Army Field
Artillery officer to procure/contract for artillery related
equipment. The direct correlation of Army/Marine Corps specialties
is unique however and should not be applied across the board, i.e.
to Air Force or Navy officers. In some limited examples in weeks
in general it does not."
9) FA 51; Scored answer: DISAGREE. "The service 'ethics' are
different and influence perceptions of fairness and urgency."
10) FA 97; Scored answer: AGREE. "I believe the underlying
key is an understanding of the mission of the respective service."
11) FA 51; Scored answer: AGREE. "User experience is vital in
the requirements and material development community but not
necessarily in the contract office."
12) FA 97; Scored answer: NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE. "While
not doubting the ability of a contracting officer from another
service to fill an Army billet, each service has unique
requirements to learn. I find it interesting to think that at some
time in the future, we may have a 'purple' Acquisition Corps.
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Joint Program Offices already do this to some degree, each service
involved in the program has 'service' representation."
13) FA 51; Scored answer: DISAGREE. "A KO from another
service would be just as effective if he/she took the time to
familiarize themselves with the equipment it uses, capabilities,
employment, tactics, etc. Without this you may just as well
civilianize all 97 positions."
14) FA 97; Scored answer: DISAGREE. "Effectiveness depends on
knowing the system (i.e. how the service is structured and how
lines of communication/responsibility are structured) . 'Other'
service people would need to learn how the Army works before they
could engage the gears effectively. More important is the ability
to ensure that the requiring activity has completely described the
requirement and checks to ensure what is desired (end item) is
actually acquired."
15) FA 97; Scored answer: AGREE. "If he would be as effective
handling contracting issues however would have to learn the Army
system and acronyms .
"
4. Statement 2d Modifying Statements.
1) FA 97; Scored answer: STRONGLY AGREE. "Aside from
performing as the technical expert to place a requirement on
contract, much of a KO's time is spent refining the SOW/CDRL/GFE so
that he has an enforceable contract."
2) FA 97; Scored answer: AGREE. "In most buying commands,
technical specialists (i.e. engineers, logisticians, etc.) write
SOWs. The PCO merely integrates all requirements into an RFP.
Knowledge would help, but is not a must."
3) FA 97; Scored answer: NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE. "PCOs
should review and question but not become an active player in
requirements documents .
"
4) FA 51; Scored answer: NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE. "Our KOs
are only 'paper graders'—none of them help prepare SOWs."
5) FA 97; Scored answer: DISAGREE. "Contracting officers
don't prepare requirements documents. They do, however, review for
adequacy prior to release of a solicitation."
6) FA 51; Scored answer: NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE. "PMs do
SOWs not contracting officers."
7) FA 51; Scored answer: DISAGREE. "My experience would
indicate troop experience would facilitate his sense of cooperation
and urgency in executing contracts. In my experience, PCOs do not
develop SOWs or contract requirement packages, they are done in
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house by PM personnel and then handed over to PCO for execution .
"
8) FA 51; Scored answer: DISAGREE. "Project Manager prepares
statement of work .
"
9) FA 97; Scored answer: AGREE. "However, the PCO rarely
'develops' the SOW. This is a PEO responsibility."
10) FA 97; Scored answer: DISAGREE. "SOWs are prepared in
Program Mgmt office. PCOs only review for contractual
requirements .
"
11) FA 51; Scored answer: NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE.
"Contracting officer doesn't prepare SOW."
12) FA 51; Scored answer: NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE. "I've
never had a PCO with user experience on the item he was contracting
for. I think user experience is irrelevant to being a PCO."
5. Statement 2e Modifying Statements.
1) FA 97; Scored answer: NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE. "There
are many good COs that are civilian with no military experience
however I feel a good philosophy is to incorporate military COs
with experience to balance the contracting environment."
2) FA 51; Scored answer: STRONGLY AGREE. "Your question e.
sums up what I believe to be the opinion of the PM community here
in St. Louis, at least in PEO Aviation. I can say its a consensus
because of the fact that shortly after receiving you questionnaire,
I remarked to my boss on the receipt of your letter and
questionnaire while waiting for a meeting to begin which involved
many other PMs (both 0-5 and 0-6 PMs) . After a brief discussion
during which most of PMs present offered comments, it became
apparent that PMs value procurement expertise over operational
expertise without question. This also happens to be my opinion as
well."
3) FA 97; Scored answer: DISAGREE. "I feel there is a real
need for operational experience in the acquisition community. It
is too easy to lose sight of the needs of the soldier. A
substantial level of operational experience must be maintained in
order to stay focused on soldier support."
4) FA 51; Scored answer: DISAGREE. "Currently in the
acquisition community we are on a track to get away from user
experience-e.g. all acq. corps assignments after 8 YOS means no
user exp necessary."
5) FA 97; Scored answer: DISAGREE. "The benefits of user




6. Statement 2f Modifying Statements.
1) FA 51; Scored answer: AGREE. "This is usually but not
always the case .
"
2) FA 51; Scored answer: DISAGREE. "It definitely helps if
the PCO is familiar with the item being procured because it
provides another 'set of eyes' in the review process, i.e. the PCO
can double check the engineer who wrote the SOW."
3) FA 97; Scored answer: DISAGREE. "This is not always true,
especially for R&D contracting where requirements may not always be
well-defined. For more mature systems and spares, requirements may
be more refined. User familiarity with similar systems is helpful
in instances of emerging systems, e.g. armored experience with the
development of the next generation tank or gun-system."
4) FA 97; Scored answer: STRONGLY DISAGREE. "Gov't specs are
most frequent area that leads to claims (those that most frequently
found versus government are defective specifications). The more
knowledgeable people reviewing the Specs/SOW the better.
Frequently, a PCO with user experience will be able to find errors
or areas for improvement that spec writers/engineers without
operational/field experience will miss."





6) FA 97; Scored answer: DISAGREE. "You must have some
familiarity to give a sanity check or know the Army organization
and system well enough to get questions answered."
7) FA 97; Scored answer: DISAGREE. "Acquisition is not a
paper process, the PCO must be involved early in the requirements
determination/definition to understand what hardware is needed to
meet what requirements of the customer. The PCO may not have to
have personal user experience (although it can help), but he has to
be committed to educating himself on what and why he is buying
specific hardware to meet specific user needs."
8) FA 51; Scored answer: DISAGREE. "Contracting officer must
have commodity experience, not necessarily operational experience."
9) FA 97; Scored answer: DISAGREE. "It might be, this is a
key reason for KO familiarity with subject matter."
10) FA 51; Scored answer: STRONGLY AGREE. "The PM office
writes the specs and purchase description based upon the ROC/ORD
before the PCO ever gets involved."
11) FA 97; Scored answer: DISAGREE. "The requirement may be
defined, but it may not be the solution to the deficiency. The
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operational use of the item may impact quantity or configuration."
12) FA 97; Scored answer: STRONGLY DISAGREE. "Regardless of
who the PCO is, having some background on the item/effort he/she is
buying is essential. Form, fit or function is as important as
cost. It does no one any good to have a low cost item that meets
requirements definition, but fails to work."
7. Statement 2g Modifying Statements.
1) FA 51; Scored answer: AGREE. "Contracting staff are a part
of all reviews (e.g. engineering, design, testing, etc.) in my PM
experience. I demand they be familiar with all aspects of the
program to ensure understanding of why I ask for certain things in
contracting actions. This has worked very well."
2) FA 51; Scored answer: AGREE. "Not only with the item, but
with how it is used and the environment it is used in .
"
3) FA 97; Scored answer: STRONGLY AGREE. "This is probably
the biggest flaw in orienting new FA 97 officers. The contracting
command should assign mentors (as does DCAA) to familiarize all new
FA 97s on-site at production plants if possible—even for spares."
8. Statement 2h Modifying Statements.
1) FA 97; Scored answer: AGREE. "Key term is generally , i.e.
Im 93 Radiacmeters are procured by CECOM, not AMCCOM. There are
other systems in a similar state."
2) FA 97; Scored answer: NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE. "Be
careful here! TACOM fields trucks to all branches; AMCCOM fields
ordinance and weapons to all branches; ATCOM is now responsible for
Aviation and Troop support; CECOM delivers commo equipment to
everyone .
"
3) FA 97; Scored answer: DISAGREE. "Communications-
Electronics may be the exception .
"
4) FA 97; Scored answer: STRONGLY DISAGREE. "Repair/spare
parts may be used in many systems—as may many components, e.g.
CECOM buys radios—user may be Armor, Infantry, QM officer just as
easily as Signal Corps. The Ordnance/QM officer may be as familiar
as Armor officer with diesel engines/track pads/radiators etc."
5) FA 51; Scored answer: DISAGREE. "Not always true. My PCO
is at MICOM and I'm responsible for the sight on the M2 Bradley.
Also I'm responsible for various test equipment used by
ordnance/maintenance personnel .
"
6) FA 97; Scored answer: AGREE. "Yes, but many of the
officers in a place like TACOM are ordnance - they don't fight with
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the equipment, but have to maintain it. Don't forget the PM's
organization .
"
7) FA 97; Scored answer: STRONGLY DISAGREE. "Nearly all
branches of the Army use TACOM products. Trucks, HMMWVs, etc
support throughout all TOE units and their authorized force
structure. User familiarity with maneuver, maintenance, and
sustainment doctrine is tremendously helpful in horizontal
integration of TACOM systems across all of our battlefield
operating systems .
"
8) FA 51; Scored answer: NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE. "Too
general; tactical missiles are employed by infantry, aviation,
field artillery, and air defense artillery!"
9) FA 51; Scored answer: DISAGREE. "TACOM procures numerous
end items for support branches and light forces."
10) FA 97; Scored answer: DISAGREE. "Agree they are track
users, but others also use wheel vehicles, repair wheels and
tracks, and order/ship/receive/stock repair parts and end items."
11) FA 51; Scored answer: STRONGLY DISAGREE. "Several buying
commands (e.g. CECOM) buy thousands of systems, sets, repair parts,
etc. which are used by other than signal soldiers. For example
SINCGAR radio, EPLRS user units, GPS receivers. As well, millions
of repair parts are procured annually in each buying command—these
are 'used' by ordnance soldiers, etc. It would be most difficult
to align a specific branch experience with a commodity to be
procured except at the major system level (e.g. new tank, new
aircraft, etc.)
12) FA 51; Scored answer: DISAGREE. "TACOM has the Advanced
Field Artillery System, Combat Mobility Vehicle, Heavy Assault
Bridge, and numerous other programs which are not Infantry and
Armor branch related."
13) FA 97; Scored answer: NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE. "In
only a few instances such as aviation. Almost all branches use the
products Of CECOM, TACOM, AMCCOM."
14) FA 97; Scored answer: NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE. "Trucks
and radios are used by everyone .
"
15) FA 97; Scored answer: NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE.
"Confusing question. Don't understand what it has to do w/context
of questions."
16) FA 97; Scored answer: STRONGLY DISAGREE. "This is a
terrible over-generalization! Commodity buying commands of AMC buy
items of common applicability for all soldiers (e.g. radios, wheel
vehicles, weapons, clothing, etc, etc). With regards to
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specialized end items, in almost every case a variety of CMFs are
required to produce a proper SOW (e.g. a tank requires expertise
from Armor, Ordnance, Transportation, Quartermaster, and Signal
officers)
.
17) FA 97; Scored answer: DISAGREE. "Disagree because
drivers, mechanics, and all other types of logisticians use TACOM
managed items as well as maintain and support these items."
18) FA 97; Scored answer: AGREE. "As defense dollars shrink,
we may see more alignment of buying commands. This could lead to
some 'unusual' marriages within the DOD."
9. Statement 2i Modifying Statements.
1) FA 51; Scored answer: STRONGLY AGREE. "Unfortunately, HQDA
& AMC are decreasing the number of junior officer positions and the
requirements of the AAC will limit the experience level of
uniformed military."
2) FA 51; Scored answer: AGREE. "'Green suiters' are present
in acquisition land to kick tail and take names 1"
3) FA 97; Scored answer: NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE. "The
number of active duty officers doing contracting is so small that
the argument can't be sustained. Officers perform KO duties
primarily to train them in contracting fundamentals so they can
perform with a good basis as program managers or in contracting
office management."
4) FA 97; Scored answer: STRONGLY AGREE. "I feel the biggest
value of our operational experience is our already developed
management/leadership skills and our ability to show/teach others
what the 'real' Army is like."
5) FA 97; Scored answer: STRONGLY AGREE. "Uniformed, field
experienced acquisition officers provide not only a tangible return
to an organization - practical user experience and employment of
systems, tactics, and 'big picture' view of service
requirements. . .they also provide the intangibles of unique
perspectives, user representation imbedded in the buying activity,
and can talk to the requiring activity. The acquisition community
would be markedly less effective without the uniformed, field
experienced soldier in the process."
6) FA 97; Scored answer: STRONGLY AGREE. "Yes - one of the
purposes—however as an SF officer I would encourage you to study
and question the Army's true need for FA 97s in the combat support
role for contingency operations .
"
7) FA 97; Scored answer: STRONGLY AGREE. "In addition to
user/operational experience, brings sense of urgency - is able to
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stress and relate sense of importance. Is able to translate
stockage level , critical readiness item into required sense of
urgency and importance that ensures correct priority is placed on
the action, without this, all procurements are seen as the same.
Also able to assure users their needs are understood and being
responded to in an appropriate manner."
8) FA 51; Scored answer: STRONGLY AGREE. "Real purpose is to
always do the right thing for the Array, which may be the wrong
thing for the organization."
9) FA 51; Scored answer: AGREE. " Additionally the sense of
urgency greensuiters bring, the leadership, fresh ideas (civilians
stay in PM shops forever) is only made available to acquisition by
uniforms (many disagree with me on this) . Greensuiters can also go
to HQDA and service schools and get things done where civilians
cannot
.
10) FA 97; Scored answer: STRONGLY AGREE. "But, the expertise
is more an Army 'sense' and how the Army works than experience with
a specific piece of equipment WHEN SERVING AS A 97. In program
management, there ought to be more of an operational focus."
11) FA 51; Scored answer: STRONGLY AGREE. "Additionally, user
experienced uniformed soldiers can talk to the user at each stage
of the procurement .
"
12) FA 97; Scored answer: AGREE. "Even more important than
operational experience is the enthusiasm, willingness to work and
mission orientation that all military have. I would rather have 10
military than 20 civilians in a tough, volatile, and changing
circumstance .
"
13) FA 97; Scored answer: STRONGLY AGREE. "In addition to
operational expertise, uniformed members bring a sense of urgency
and positive, can do thinking to the acquisition community."
14) FA 51; Scored answer: STRONGLY AGREE. " 'Should be ' one of
the purposes.
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APPENDIX D. SURVEY SECTION 3: MODIFYING STATEMENTS
Question 3a. Should there be a heavier reliance on branch coding
for all FA 97 positions? In other words should more FA 97 billets
be coded for a specific branch or branch type (e.g. Combat Arms or
Combat Support)?
NO; "A FA 97 officer is by definition an Industrial Manager and
Contracting officer. The likely chance of a career of contracting
officer successive assignments is slim at best. Career succession
into Prog. Management is fruitful after years of contracting exp."
AD/97
NO; "Once coded 97' s should not do combat or combat support work
—
they should stay acquisition up to and including FLAG officers with
'acquisition' backgrounds not FLAG officers who go to 'shake and
bake' acquisition courses as promotable Colonels!" OD/97
NO; "DLA assignments are joint tours and should remain 97 versus
branch specific. My position requires a 15 (aviator) because of
Government Flight Representative duties. Only an aviator can
perform GFR duties . " AV/97
NO; "Doesn't seem to matter. Despite the "branch immaterial"
coding, assignments officers, procurement execs, etc. search for
acq corps personnel who have experience with specific types of
hardware (that's why AAC officers with Armor experience generally
end up at TACOM) . So, there is already a heavy reliance on
background . " AR/5
1
NO; "We primarily enforce contract regs, pubs, and functions
something that is branch immaterial." OD/97
NO; "Specific branch experience can only be justified for a small
number of major systems programs." AV/97
NO; "By getting officers of different branches rotating into a
position there is a better chance of issues being looked at from
different perspectives." IN/97
NO; "Formal training can fill the gap. Need to make the break
between branch and the Acquisition Corps at the 0-4 level. Command
and General Staff level schooling, should be the last opportunity
to 'rub shoulders' with the Branch." OD/97
NO; " I do not believe 51/97 positions should be aligned by
branch. Most of the weapon systems in the field today were
developed by officers from other than the user's branch. The
services should seek officers from the Cbt Arms to manage/procure
combat systems, but officers should compete based upon past
performance, not branch." OD/51
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NO; "The FA 97 needs Army operational/field experience. A FA 97
w/Armor experience as a 2LT/1LT/CPT could, I feel, operate
effectively in a DLA position dealing with ordnance items" OD/51
NO; "Only exception, perhaps is Aviation acqn" EN/97
NO; "Not necessarily. As mentioned previously, this depends on
whether an officer is assigned to a PEO/PM 'core' position or a
matrix-support position, e.g. P&D Directorate. This could also
depend on whether the matrix support is provided as general support
or colocated direct support." OD/97
NO; "While branch experience is desired and may enhance the
process it may just as well be a detractor. An infantry officer
might be less objective about a contract affecting an infantry
system. His opinions may seep into the contracting process leading
to be at odds with decisions made by the PM or may cause him to
want to interject himself into the decision making process at the
operational/technical level which is the province of TRADOC and the
PM; or an infantry PCO could just as easily give in too readily in
negotiations due to his 'infatuation' with a 'gee whiz' infantry
systems that is overpriced." IN/97
NO; "Except for aviation FA 97 who usually are required to fly at
certain locations. My last DPRO assignment provided contract
administration for Army Chaparral systems; Navy F-18 FLIRs, and Air
Force AIM-9 missiles. We had an Army aviator, Army Chemical Corps,
and Air Force officers assigned." AV/97
NO; "I feel the important thing to consider is that we have
qualified Army officers involved and in charge of acquisition of
Army materiel. Branch coding is less important. A CSS branch
officer is just as capable of acquiring combat systems as a combat
arms officer." OD/97
NO; "Some buying commands have requirements peculiar to the branch
(aviation, nuclear ammo, for example) which are facilitated by
branch specific 97s. Most, however, are not in this category."
AV/51
NO; "Not for just the sake of requiring a branch. If a branch
immaterial person can do the job—let them, we have more
flexibility." OD/51
NO; "In DLA (DCMC) positions, all services, DOE, NASA, etc, are
supported-what is learned by this is valuable and transfers
directly to better contracts , requirements and performance .
"
AV/97
NO; "With the introduction of FM 100-5 (Airland Battle) in 1982,
the Army shifted its focus to training officers of all branches
with a 'combined arms' understanding of how we prepare for and
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fight wars. In acquisition positions a basic understanding of the
battlefield operating systems and how they are horizontally
integrated is sufficient to achieve FA 97 success." QM/97
NO; "All FA positions in the Acquisition Corps should be branch
immaterial. Each branch should be required to contribute a
determined number of individuals to the Acq. Corps but the Acq.
Corps should manage positions only by functional area." IN/51
NO; "Contracting officers should be proficient at contracting, not
technical or programmatic influence on the product, project, or
program manager or his staff." AR/51
YES & NO; "Both marked. If the FA 97 pool has sufficient
population to enjoy this luxury—> Yes. If not—> No." IN/51
YES; "It will help bridge the credibility gap with both the PMO
and Contractor and make him a member of the acquisition team.
Examples of credibility problems 1) a nonAirborne type negotiating
for parachutes 2) a non-aviator negotiating for the AH-64 Helmet
Mounted Display system 3) non-combat arms type negotiating for a
new rifle 4) non-maintainer negotiating for test equipment or tool
sets." AV/97
YES; "Depending on the type of assignment certainly has more of a
need than others for a branch specific officer. It tends to give
the officer more credibility. For example, I was an OD officer in
the Chemical/Bio Cmd integrating the NBC suits into the new Abrams
Tank. The PM (OD) liked the fact an OD officer was the program
integrator vs a chemical officer." OD/97
YES; "For positions requiring both acquisition and product/item
experience." QM/97
YES; "Branches should be targeted to commodity groupings. While
coding should be branch specific when possible, the wholesale
coding (personnel requirement) may not be possible due to other
branch accession challenges—i.e. Signal Corps, Engineers, SF, OD
& QM." OD/97
YES; "This would facilitate the Navy or Army in getting a better
product for the soldier." AD/51
YES; "Probably. I have not thoroughly reviewed the MAPL and also
don't know the specifics of each position, but, generally I feel
most positions could be more branch specific." AV/97
YES; "Required: Combat arms Desired: Aviation" AD/97
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NO ANSWER GIVEN; "It doesn't matter- I tried to do this as a young
captain in 1979-PERSCOM only picks up the first two digits of any
requirement-so this has never been fixed. So if you code a
position 97/12 or 97/11 you can just as easily get a 97/92. The
manning position system will not pick up the trailer specialty."
OD/97
Question 3b. If you feel there should be a heavier reliance on
branch coding should this reliance vary by grade? In other words
should entry level positions (0-3 or 0-4) be branch immaterial
while critical positions (0-5 or 0-6 ) be branch coded?
NO; "In fact the reverse may be appropriate." OD/51
NO; "Reverse-for PMO positions—0-3/0-4 branch material. 0-5/0-6
less important." OD/51
NO; "0-3 or 0-4 should have more recent 'user' experience." AD/51
NO; "If entry level positions are immaterial, critical positions
should be immaterial . " IN/51
NO; "I would think it should be just the opposite. The more junior
positions should be branch related while the more senior positions
would be branch immaterial." OD/51
NO; "Response assumes FA 97 billet. Being branch immaterial
allows for greater opportunity to broaden the experience base while
branch specific has an opposite effect and reduces flexibility on
assignments." IN/51
NO; "In my opinion, all officers are more comfortable dealing with
the commodity they have had field experience on. It is a better
situation whatever the rank. However with the 0-5 or 0-6 it is not
as important in some assignments." OD/97
NO; "Vice versa, entry level coded, higher level immaterial" AD/51
NO; "The CPT or MAJ will be doing the bulk of the detail work and
that is where decisions will be made that could be affected by
operational knowledge of the item/system in question. The LTC/COL
also needs to operational experience but he/she will have less
direct impact on the outcome. Also the experience being brought to
bear by the senior officer should be from a different perspective
operationally . " FA/51
NO; "If anything I would be more inclined to have 0-5/0-6
positions be branch immaterial given our officer corps 'horizontal'
training background. 0-3/0-4 may need branch coded given the
vertical training focus through the company grades. As we go
acquisition corps earlier in the future, 03 level, this point
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becomes moot." QM/97
NO; "Except I would reverse your example. Entry level positions
should be more branch specific, and senior positions could tend to
be more branch immaterial . " OD/51
NO; "But you might consider the reverse. Entry level is likely to
be more 'hands-on' where branch experience might help." OD/97
NO; "The reverse may be a better option. Entry level positions
normally cover a narrow field of contract actions in which the
previous branch qualification skills are helpful. More senior
positions normally cover a broader filed in which an understanding
of the service in general, or Defense wide, is of more benefit."
AV/51
NO; "If you can fix the first problem identified above (PERSCOM
system of ignoring trailer codes)—0-3/0-4 positions could be
branch coded with 0-5 and above branch immaterial . Keep the young
officer still in development, as closely aligned with their branch
as possible for mentoring and continuous training." OD/97
NO; "I'd prefer a 97A15 as a Procurement officer (0-3/0-4) working
aviation programs as opposed to an acquisition officer who does not
have this aviation experience." AV/97
NO; "Grow them through the accession process, otherwise there will
be skill imbalances at the higher grades. I would argue the
opposite direction—0-3/0-4 branch specific, 0-5/0-6 immaterial."
OD/97
NO; "Not necessarily. In fact it would be appropriate for all
positions to be coded a specific MOS, and not just a combat arms
MOS. CS and CSS positions are needed in some areas. It should be
up to the specific organization to have a say in the coding."
IN/51
NO; "I would recommend the reverse. Branch coding provides more
results from 0-3/0-4 given their experiences are 'fresher'. As we
single track in Acquisition and progress, operational experience
for 0-5s/0-6s becomes less important and 'older'." OD/51
NO; "If anything, this position/question should/could be
reversed." OD/51
NO; "All grades need branch coding." AV/51
NO; "Though there is more merit for higher grade positions to have
related branch experience." SC/51
NO; "Same as a-if acquisition is pure-if we develop acquisition
from 0-3 to 0-9 we won't know how to flavor for
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Armor/Infantry/Aviation/etc—we'll do acquisition as it should be."
OD/97
NO; "Should be just the reverse" QM/97
YES; "Actually, the more senior the level, the less branch
specific the job. The more senior the officer, the greater the
generalists he or she becomes." IN/97
YES; "Branch coding in many cases should apply to 0-4 positions.
Example: QM nonrated (non-aviator) executive officer Bell
Helicopter." AV/51
YES; "Possibly . One would need to look at the requirements of the
particular duty position to make this determination." QM/97
YES; "Specific branch coding is probably more necessary at the
lower levels because of the work involved, i.e. buying/contracting
for a specific commodity. Officers occupying critical positions
can be branch immaterial because general experience is needed from
a functional standpoint, i.e. DLA experience, MSC-buying
experience, etc." OD/97
YES; "Senior positions should be by branch because of command
opportunities . " QM/97
YES; "Agree with this strategy on both counts for those branches
where it makes a difference." AV/51
YES; "It depends on how much direct customer contact the officer
will have. Ones with lots of different customers or ones that deal
with civilians should be immaterial." AD/97
YES; "But this is already the case. It's the way the 'system
works'." AR/51
YES; "Entry level positions should be branch coded. Incumbents in
such positions are 'fresh' from the troop world and can maximize
the contributions of their experience, while learning the
contracting trade. Critical positions don't necessarily require
branch coding. These positions involve dealing with more general
information where user experience isn't as critical." IN/51
YES; "This would allow younger officers to gain experience and the
senior level would provide the branch specific experience for the
product that would ultimately be purchased." AD/51
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Question 3c. If you feel there should be a heavier reliance on
branch coding should this reliance vary by MACOM or duty position?
In other words should DLA (DCMAO or DPRO) positions be branch
immaterial while AMC (buying command) billets be branch coded?
NO; "Both would benefit from branch familiarity." AD/51
NO; "AMC positions can require a wide range of understanding and
user interface not predicated on specific branch orientation."
QM/97
NO; "We are 51s or 97s who are Army officers-that is our skill.
Our skill is not as a branch type officer." MI/51
NO; "DPROs should be coded branch, i.e. if you are at the Boeing,
Mac or Bell plants you should be a 97/15." AV/97
NO; "However, branch coding in contingency contracting might be
desirable. One would have to study the available population versus
requirements carefully. Conversely, putting 'mustangs' from other
branches into traditionally branch specific areas (TACOM has been
a Mecca for ordnance officers) might help broaden a command's
horizons (CGs are usually branch proponents) and reduce group think
and parochialism." IN/97
NO; "DLA/DCMAO/DPRO positions should be coded according to the
primary commodity—DPRO Martin Marietta is missile heavy-there
should be a 97/91; DPRO LTB is MLRS & ATACM- 97/13; DPRO Texas
Instruments-Javelin 97/11/91; DPRO Bell-97/aviation. MICOM, CECOM,
ATCOM, TACOM, etc-commodity/branch . However, again you will find
this has not been done because PERSCOM system only identifies the
first two characters—but the need is there.
NO; "Even DLA (DPRO) slots should be considered for branch coding
due to the technology and complexity of the major weapons systems."
AV/51
NO; "The specific organization is better able to determine the
coding of a position required through experience." IN/51
NO; "Many DLA positions are product specific. DPROs at helicopter
companies Bell/Boeing/Sikorsky/MDHC should be aviation. DPROs at
engine plants may vary depending on who their customer is;
aviation-helicopter engines; Armor/Inf-Ml and Bradley engines;
OD/TC-Truck engines." AV/97
NO; "Both senior positions should be coded by branch." QM/97
NO; "MACOMs are irrelevant-decision should be based on duties."
AV/97
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NO; "With exceptions for those requiring special qualifications
—
e.g. aircraft/pilot etc" OD/51
NO; "Depends on the position. A DPRO commander at a Contractor's
plant that builds radios ought to be a signal officer, while one
that builds helicopters ought to be an aviator." AD/97
NO; "Branch coding should be based on duty position, not MACOM."
AV/97
NO; "DLA positions also need to be branch coded." QM/97
NO; "Quite obvious by the questioning that this survey wants to
steer you towards acknowledging branch coding. An 0-3 who never
sees a line unit won't affiliate or be 'dipped' in his/her branch.
He/she won't know the difference. The politics of today-if
continued into the AC will kill it soon." OD/97
NO; "Branch code all—let's be smart." AV/51
YES and NO; "Most DCMAOs are immaterial as are most DPROs. There
are some DPROs however, that are quite specialized-Raytheon for
example where branch coding might serve to give the officer a
better background." OD/97
YES; "I agree that it is more important to branch code AMC billets
than DLA jobs." OD/97
YES; "Again. . .possibly. Each job will need to be evaluated on its
own merits and requirements." QM/97
YES; "Coding is done by requirements. . .the reason for immaterial
position growth is because that's the way the assignment process
works anyway. Immaterial provides PERSCOM and the command greater
assignment flexibility. What needs to be decided by the MACOM is
which method (Br/FA code VS 01/02/03/FA) is better suited to their
particular needs." OD/97
YES-(by duty position); "Example: not all ATCOM 97 billets need be
filled by aviators. Some specific positions should be. Some
specific positions perhaps at MICOM should be filled by a certain
branch trained 97, but not all. Many 97s at either command at 0-
3/0-4 level could be branch immaterial." AV/51
NO ANSWER GIVEN: "DLA is certainly unique being a purple suited
org so I must admit in reality branch immaterial positions are
appropriate. However, AMC should continue to use branch specific
officers in contracting assignments." OD/97
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Question 4. Have you ever encountered a situation where a lack of
user experience on the part of the contracting officer had a
detrimental effect on a procurement action? Please explain below.
"Yes. PCO for ANVRC 12 Radio in JUN 1982. PCO was Ord officer.
Acquisition should have been restricted to US only because of
critical technology base. SC officer (PCO) would 'probably' have
known this. Award went to Tetaran (Israel). Exception 13 was not
used in acquisition strategy."
"Civilian contracting officers with no operational experience lack
a sense of urgency in getting procurement actions approved. I
believe this is because they have not experienced the frustrations
of a line unit trying to accomplish its mission with
inadequate/antiquated equipment .
"
"No. I have encountered a situation where the lak of procurement
experience had a detrimental effect."
"No. If you are truly a contracting officer and have sufficient
requirement data nothing should hinder you from letting a
contract .
"
"No, however it had caused a fast course on terminology to be
conducted .
"
"No. I have encountered too many technical guru's (or professed
to be) who interfered with the process rather than support a
successful effort by concentrating on their job ."
"No, but a lack of an understanding of my business has caused big
problems!"
"An 'infantry' competition advocate could not understand why a
sole source action was in the best interest of a major missile
system (Patriot). It took 8 months to fight the battle until he
understood. This delayed the development effort greatly."
"Yes. Potential problems became real on a depot repair contract
I was associated with. Without background, a KO got off base with
respect to turnaround time, defeating the purpose of the award.
Granted, this should 've been identified by the requiring agency,
but the Ko not only didn't challenge the requirement, he didn't
know/wasn't familiar enough with the 'system' to know who to call.
Once a mistake like this is made, it takes at least a year to fix."
"No! Generally, the requiring activity has access to sufficient
experience and technical expertise."
"No. Experience is an important day to day requirement in project
management offices but we only refer to the contracting officer for
contract specific issues not material requirements issues."
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"The case in point I wish to elaborate on relates to the fact that
many times I felt PCOs dragged their feet on a procurement. They
lose sight as to how important it is to get it out to the field for
the soldier."
"Slows action as KO needs PM/user input to determine best clauses
structures.
"
"No, however I have seen cases where Project Managers of the wrong
branch were assigned to a project and as a result were less than
successful, e.g., FA officer PM of IN project, AV officer PM of FA
project.
"
"No, as a product manager I've been supported by both civilian and
military contracting officers. In both cases the support has been
outstanding, however, the key to this level of support in PCOs who
realize they are part of a contracting team and ask the right
guestions to bring the appropriate team expertise to bear."
"Yes, while assigned to the Strategic Defense initiative
organization I worked with an Air Force captain on various
procurement actions. He was effective in contracting for SETA
support for the program office but had to be led by the hand on
contracting efforts involving the more technical acquisitions
because he had no working knowledge of the equipment/systems we
were acquiring. here the operational experience was not Army
dependent but technical knowledge dependent but supports the
contention of requirement for experience .
"
"No. The biggest detriment has been due to inexperience in the FA
97 arena."
"Yes. Within DLA, Air Force officers are assigned responsibility
for Army and Navy Acquisitions. In these cases, the contracting
officer was required to solicit extensive help from outside sources
to get the job done."
"120mm tank ammo system contract until we assigned 9 ID 0-5 the
program was a mess .
"
"No-but I have seen field experienced FA 97 officers prevent dumb
decisions by civilian buyers who lacked field experience."
"No. However the lack of a clear understanding of what it is like
to be a part of the uniformed component of the Defense Department
often makes it difficult to explain to non-uniformed members the




When a KO knows the equip, what it looks like,
complexity, he can always do a better job; i.e. ACOs in plants do
a better job negotiating for spares since they can see the part,
touch it, ask questions of their engineers. PCOs back in buying
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commands have no conception what they are buying."
"No-most KOs listen to common sense or we get them replaced."
"Yes in the case of civilians but not in the case of military.
The military usually have a desire for hands-on familiarity and
seek out help."
"Yes. Many contracting officers assigned to Desert Storm only had
manor system experience-long lead time/production and R&D. They
did not know or have any base of service and support contracting
for supplies. Most of our positions are in the AMC community—few
in FORSCOM where we train for combat. These are two very different
kinds of contracting."
"Everyday at ATCOM. As an acquisition officer assigned to PEO
AVN, I have to take time to explain everything to the PCO. None of
our offices' PCOs are military and as a result every action is
delayed because the PCOs have to be 'brought up to speed' on each
procurement action (ones that are related to the aircraft we
manage). This does not apply to procurement of toilet paper!"
"No. The duties of the PCO while enhanced by understanding the
type of equipment being bought/built, are not such that they
require operational knowledge .
"
"No. We have experiences where officers from different branch has
spent time to learn the system and is more knowledgeable than
branch qualified officers."
"Not detrimental but potentially less effective. 'Green suit'
contract specialists/officers are more responsive to actions
because of empathy with the PM or soldier in the field."
"Yes. I have seen requirements for unwanted/unneeded equipment
procured because the contracting officer did not understand how the
system worked, how it was used, and what would do the job just as
well at cheaper cost. Lack of user experience also slows down the
process as the KO tries to come up to speed."
"No, primarily because all of my contracting officers have been
extremely involved with my products/systems over the years, and
thus had intimate knowledge of true user concerns and perspectives.
(All civilians)."
"JRTC, as OPFOR commander I required several special items; items
were requested and constantly had an unknowledgeable KO
continuously making subjective changes to quantities or the
type/quality of items."
"No. But to the contrary, those PCOs with user experience are a
definite help to the PM."
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"Yes, the KO lack of knowledge resulted in a procurement action
taking twice as long while he came up to speed on the program and
its complex technical issues that required user experience."
"No—only concern I have ever had was dealing with PCOs that
didn't understand the urgency of getting equip or parts to the
field."
"Yes. Lack of understanding of operational requirements resulted
in inconsistencies, errors and lack of specificity in contract
wording."
"I have seen inefficiencies because a civilian PCO could not
relate to the intended use of an item."
"The contracting officer relies on the technical advice he is
provided by the PM or MACOM technical staff (i.e. engineering). If
there's a problem it can frequently be traced to the quality of the
technical staff and advice rendered."
"No, there are adequate review cycles on all procurements (not
black projects) for all actions to be done properly by civilians."
"Not military. However, Special Operations background really
helps in the SOCOM area."
"Yes. Procurements affecting aircraft on ground, particularly
during combat, or critical parts affecting safety of flight
(fleetwide groundings) were not handled expeditiously or with
proper judgment because the PCO was not an aviator."
"No. My experience with contracting officers (both mil and civ)
have been good. Most likely due to the particular individuals
training, experience and professionalism."
"No—not if the KO was uniformed, but as a PM I have observed,
been a victim of, civilian PCO's lacking a user view."
"No—was very careful in pre-selection and staffing of procurement
team to ensure this didn't happen."
"More on the ACO side—it sure doesn't hur to know your
commodities .
"
"The only detriment was when the contracting officer steered away
from acquisition principles and bought "specialty" or "gold plated'
products they thought the service needed when they were in charge -
10 or 12 years before. So we buy 'old' new technology."
"Yes—some 0-3s and below during Desert Storm, however they
quickly came up to speed."
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"Not directly-many delays, however, in overcoming
misinterpretations of user requirements."
"No. The project office provides the user experience in working
with the contracting officer."
"Paying a premium for a battery with a marginally longer life. If
the KO had field experience he would probably realize that the
batteries in question were almost always changed before going out
on a mission, not leaving them in the radio until they died.
Excessive expenditure of funds .
"
"As an auditor in north Alabama, my knowledge of missile systems
helped speed up several RFP audits by being able to clarify for
other auditors SOW requirements. I've had this same experience as
a PCO. None fell into a detrimental category since SME engineers
can always be made available in time."
"Yes! Contracting officer could not understand why guying a
helicopter was any different than buying BDUs! There is a
significant difference the level of quality, testing, etc
required.
"
"No , but it could at times .
"
"My experience has been with DLA civilian ACOs. Most problems
come from ACO's understanding a company's business process vs hard
Government requirements .
"
"Lack of user experience will slow down the process time because
he/she may not have the knowledge."
"No—on the other hand user experience always tends to enhance the
procurement action, but not in all cases."
"Yes—purchasing repair parts for missile systems by individuals
who do not understand what they are, complexity, etc has led to
wasteful procurements .
"
"Detrimental only in the sense that the time necessary for a
contracting officer to get system 'smart' is extensive. This
undoubtedly causes inefficiencies in the early part of a
contracting officer's tour of duty."
"No. However I have encountered situations where a lack of
general military knowledge has hindered a civilian contracting
officer. User experience is only essential during the requirements
development portion of the acquisition process."
"Yes. KO had difficulty prioritizing my program because he
considered it the M88A1 not M88A2."
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"No. It's a business decision. The program office and technical
community are the team resources in this situation. Use them."
"No, motivation and an open-mind and common sense or the lack
thereof are the key."
"Yes. The situation was the Defense Logistic Service Center was
trying to procure a state of the art, random access memory video
disc for use in the catalog update business. The procuring
activity, DRMS base contracting had no expertise in ADP hardware or
software. They couldn't understand the SOW, much less put together
a solicitation."
"Only concern that I have had is that some KOs don't have the same
sense of urgency that a 'green suiter' may have, since they don't
understand how the end item is used. This isn't always bad but it
isn't that common."
"Limited delay. PCO sought (rightly so!), answers to question and
concerns to reach a level of understanding of the item he was
procuring. A user or more experienced PCO would have moved the
action quicker."
"No, but it sure makes the PM's job easier if the PCO/ACO can
relate to the system and how it will be employed."
"No because all KO I've dealt with had Army experience—At SSDC we
have civilian KOs but we were not fielding anything and I don't
think it mattered."
"The PCO or KO need not be expert in relation to the technical
aspects of a purchase. He needs to have available and use the
technical support to confirm that what he is acquiring meets the
needs of the customer technically."
"None that I can recall. However it was obvious in some cases
where KO was familiar with the equipment and the planning side went
smoother .
"
"I have no military (97) involved in any of my procurement
actions—all civilians. They have great depth in procurement
matters—little in materiel."
"Yes. Ask most KOs what NOE flight is and they don't know.
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